

Language Policy in Education in Contemporary Ukraine: A Continuous Discussion of Contested National Identity

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Abstract

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, language policy has been dramatically transformed from the clear dominance of Russian as “the language of intercultural communication” in all ex-Soviet republics to the promotion of the so-called titular languages in all spheres of public life. In post-Soviet Ukraine, the transition to Ukrainian as the only state language has become particularly painful due to the spark of outrage of a significant proportion of Russian speakers and inconsistent measures in the sphere of language policy and planning. The system of education, which is the focus of the current study, has also been transformed several times, depending on the preferences of the political elites that aggravated the already complicated situation and fuelled the public and academic debates. The recent Ukrainian crisis, the military and media confrontation with Russia pose a serious challenge to Ukraine’s national identity and continue to be an open field of public contestation. This article seeks to understand what role language plays in defining national identity through the analysis of the public debates on the educational reforms in the most crucial periods of 2011-2012, 2013-2015 and 2017. The study is based on the theory of social problems construction (Kitsuse and Spector, 2009) and the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse elaborated by R. Keller (2013) which provide an explanation why language policy has become such an overtly politicized phenomenon in Ukrainian discourse.

Keywords: language policy; educational reforms; national identity; blogs; social problems

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The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 has profoundly changed the political outlook of the world. All former USSR republics obtained a sovereign status that allowed them to choose the trajectory of their political development. The Soviet period had a significant influence on language policy in contemporary Ukraine, which is the focus of the following article. In the Soviet period, the so-called languages of “titular nationalities” (and Ukrainian is among them) were underrepresented and discriminated against and Russian was designated as the ‘language of intercultural communication’ (Malia, 2008). Young nation-states (re)-established after 1991 were confronted, along with the severe economic and political dilemmas, with two main problems: a poor command of the “titular” language and huge influxes of migrants, especially Russian-speaking.

After 1991 and the politics of ‘gradual de-Russification’ (Pavlenko, 2008), the Russian language lost its privileged political position and Ukrainian was established as the only state languages, which caused the outrage of a significant proportion of Russian speakers and led to the ongoing public debates on the current *status quo* in language policy. As Aneta Pavlenko (2008: 1-2) states in the introductory part of the book *Multilingualism in Post-Soviet Countries*:

These countries as a whole have emerged as a contested linguistic space, where emotional exchanges over language-related issues are fodder for the daily news and where disagreements over language- and education-related decisions have led to demonstrations and at times even military conflicts and secession.

Consequently, the controversial demographic situation and the promotion of Ukrainian as the only state language, without taking into consideration a huge group of Russian-speakers, enhanced a historical chance for this country to conduct the politics of nationalizing states, in terms of Rogers Brubaker’s theory of nationalism. He considers them as the ‘states that conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations, yet as, “incomplete” or “unrealized” nation-states, as insufficiently “national” in a variety of senses’ (Brubaker, 1996: 412; 2003). It means that Ukrainian politics after the restoration of independence is characterized by the decisive attempts of the governments to promote the interests of the so-called “core” nation. Language policy has also become a central element of the nation-building projects in modern Ukraine.

The current Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention of Russia have vividly shown that the question of language and the discrimination perceived by Russian speakers can become

not only the part of the political game but can also lead to serious ethnic violence in the overall post-Soviet region. For instance, Barbora Moormann-Kimáková (2015: 1) argues:

It would be far too much to maintain that the Ukrainian conflict is one about language or that it was caused by a language law: the roots of the conflict, the parties involved and its further development are much more complex than that. But, it is a conflict in which, at one point, the change of language regime could have possibly played a positive role by perhaps winning the loyalties of more Russian speakers – and it has played a negative one instead. As the conflict between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government forces continues, the language issue remains part of the demands of the former, and most importantly, a strong argument showing that Russian speakers are not (and never would be) treated well in Ukraine.

In reaction to the Ukrainian political crisis, the language debates highlighted again the problematic position of Russian speakers who not only lost their politically advantageous status but have always been the object of the manipulations from Ukrainian politicians who heavily used the language card before the parliamentary and presidential elections. Thus, the Ukrainian course of political development has never been linear, unlike in the Baltic States which chose the trajectory of integration into Europe and NATO immediately after the collapse of the USSR. The periods of active nationalization (the presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko) when the Ukrainian language was actively promoted in all spheres public life, including education, were followed by the periods of partial denationalization (the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich who opted for the economic and cultural integration with Russia) when Russian got the status of the regional language in several Ukrainian *oblasts*.

The identity of Russian speakers that is the focus of the following paper has always been the question of the academic and public discussions in Ukraine. ‘Because the Russian/Russian-speaking community was so fragmented from the start of the post-Soviet era, it could be argued that any study into “Russian-speaking identity” is potentially problematic from the outset’ (Cheskin, 2016). However, this fact did not discourage the scholars working across humanities and social sciences to study the identity of Russian speakers (for example, see Polese, 2012; Kulyk, 2015). The peculiar feature of the Ukrainian political landscape is the polarization of the political and linguistic preferences of the population. It is argued by some scholars (see Kubicek, 1994) that Ukraine is traditionally subdivided into the more Russified West and South and the more Ukrainized Centre and West. It is also proved by the results of the online maps made by Aleksandr Kireev and Aleksei Sidorenko that the political preferences of the population are clearly divided between “pro-Russian” and “pro-Ukrainian” politicians. Thus, the majority of the Western and Central regions voted for Yulia Tymoshenko in 2010, whereas

Eastern regions and the Crimea supported Viktor Yanukovich who promised to grant Russian the status of the second state language. The regional polarization is one of the factors that has a great impact on the overall course of Ukrainian political development and language and education policies in particular. This feature has also become an important prerequisite for the intervention of the Russian military troops in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of the Crimea under the auspices of “Russian-speakers protection”. These peculiar features make Ukraine a unique and outstanding case among other post-Soviet countries.

Since I aim to concentrate on the changed perception of national identity in Ukraine, I need to define the term “identity” that I will apply in the article. Following Berger and Luckman’s understanding of identity, I consider it as a negotiable and flexible process and not as a stable phenomenon. Identities are constructed and, more often in the context of post-Soviet development, are contested by different social actors. Berger and Luckmann (1966: 194) assume that ‘identity is formed by social processes. Once crystallized, it is maintained, modified or even reshaped by social relations. The social processes in both the formation and the maintenance of identity are determined by the social structure’. Thus, the aim of the paper is to analyze the process of *negotiation of identity* in the public debates on the language policy and education in the Russian-language blogs and news websites that were chosen for the empirical analysis. As Pavlenko and Blackledge (2001: 249) note, ‘negotiation of identities will be understood as the interplay between reflective positioning, that is, self-representation, and interactive positioning, whereby others attempt to reposition particular individuals or groups’.

In this paper, the focus is on the public debates surrounding the educational reforms and language policy in contemporary Ukraine. As Soll, Salvet and Masso (2015: 223-224), who did research on educational policies in another post-Soviet country (Estonia), argue:

The education system plays an important role in the preservation and development of language: primary and lower secondary education are considered particularly important in terms of the development of the language skills and knowledge. One task of the education system is to ensure the cultural reproduction of society through the development of students’ knowledge and skills, including language skills and knowledge and the sharing of cultural values and traditions.

It means that education and the language of instruction play a crucial role in the process of *negotiation of identities* and have become a powerful instrument in transmitting the official historical narratives and nationalizing projects in post-Soviet Ukraine. Moreover, the educational system has been extremely sensitive to the changes in the political climate in Ukraine. As it has been already noted, the period of partial denationalization, following the

presidency of Yanukovich from 2010 until 2014, was characterized by the decisive attempts of the Ministry of Education to introduce more Russian lessons at schools. On the contrary, after the Euromaidan and complete change of the political elites, the course of Ukrainian educational policies has been significantly transformed in the direction of complete Ukrainization of schools and universities.

For further empirical analysis of the public debates in education, Russian-language news websites and blogs were selected and thoroughly scrutinized. According to Graham Lampa (2004), blogs and digital media in general not only represent one of the key sources of information nowadays but altogether form a ‘discursive transnational online community’. The role of blogs is also difficult to overestimate, as they offer the platform for various groups of claim-makers to articulate their interests and form agenda that is of utmost importance for the study of the discourses formation, production, and reproduction (Maratea, 2008). I have deliberately concentrated on three periods of educational reforms, namely 2011-2012 (before the Euromaidan), 2013-2015 (right during the political crisis) and 2017 (after the crisis), in order to analyse how the perception of national identity has been changed in the context of the military confrontation with Russia and reorientation towards the West and how the discourse of language and education has evolved in the last 5 years. For the purpose of my analysis, I have focused on the most visited news websites and blog platforms in Ukraine. The sources include the weekly online journal *Zerkalo Nedeli*, news website *Novoe Vremya* and two blogospheres linked to the news websites, *Blogs Ukrainskaya Pravda* and *Blogs Korrespondent*.

Based on the theory of social problems construction elaborated by J. Kitsuse and M. Spector (2009), the concept of language games (Kitsuse and Ibarra, 2003) and the *sociology of knowledge approach (SKAD)* developed by R. Keller (2013), the aim of the following paper is to find out what are the public attitudes towards the educational initiatives and how the identities of Russian-speakers are constructed and articulated in the discourses of the Russian-language blogs and news websites in contemporary Ukraine. The theory of social problem construction that will be analysed in the next section provides an explanation as to why language policy has become such an extremely politicized issue that polarizes the Ukrainian society.

1. The social constructivist approach in the theories of social problems

As is clear from the description of the complicated language policy in contemporary Ukraine, language issues have been one of the most widely discussed topics since 1991. That is why for many researchers of the language situation the question, *why* is language policy is so extremely politicized, is one of the most challenging and difficult ones to answer. The theory of social problems construction developed by J. Kitsuse and M. Spector (2009) and the research programme elaborated by J. Kitsuse and P. Ibarra (2003) serve as a fruitful theoretical and methodological framework that can be applied for the investigation of the main rhetorical strategies used by social actors to construct the issue of language policy as a social problem in the discourses of the Russian-language blogs and news websites and how these attitudes reflect different notions of national identity.

‘The central problem for a theory of social problems is to account for the emergence, nature and maintenance of claims-making and responding activities’ (Kitsuse and Spector, 2009: 75-76). They view social problems as the *rhetoric* and not as objective conditions. Kitsuse and Spector repeatedly emphasize that their theoretical approach is based in the studies of claim-making activities. ‘Claim-making is always a form of interaction: a demand made by one party to another that something should be done about some putative condition’ (Kitsuse and Spector, 2009: 78). By constructing social problems, the members of the society *claim* that some harmful social conditions exist and *claim* that this problem should be eliminated or solved. Thus, different interests articulated by various groups often become an open field of contestation. Thus, I assume that the constructivist approach to social problems perfectly explains *why* and *how* language policy is constructed as a social problem and what social actors participate in the discourse formation, production, and reproduction.

J. Kitsuse and P. Ibarra (2003) developed a well-structured and comprehensive framework for analysing social problems by concentrating on motifs or language (vernacular) games that will be applied for the study of the public debates and educational reforms in the Russian-language blogs and news websites. Motifs are recurrent figures of speech and themes that highlight or summarize a central element of a social problem that often includes morally permeated phrases and metaphors (e.g. crisis, catastrophe, abuse, scandal, threat). Kitsuse and Ibarra emphasize that the construction of social problems is hardly imaginable without using moral judgments or appeals to the general public, because a great many social problems are deeply intertwined with the notion of justice and various perceptions of equality. For instance,

the investigation of motifs in discourses produced by newspapers or news websites, the tone of the articles, the structure, and rhetorical questions can reveal what actors are included or excluded from decision-making, who the recipients of information are and whose position the selected publications represent. In my research, I will concentrate on different rhetorical strategies (the rhetoric of loss, the rhetoric of entitlement etc.) used to construct language policy as a social problem in the public discourses in contemporary and Ukraine. In the next section of my article, I aim at analysing the public attitudes towards the educational reforms in Russian-language blogs and news websites for three periods such 2011-2012, 2013-2015 and 2017.

2. Debates on educational reforms in Ukraine in 2011-2012

The reforms in the sphere of secondary and higher education deserve a particular place in the overall debates on language policy in independent Ukraine. They are associated with the name of the former Minister of Education Dmytro Tabachnyk, whose activity caused heated debates and affected also language policy in Ukraine. He proposed to introduce more Russian lessons at schools, which led to an ambiguous public reaction and polarized the Ukrainian society. Moreover, new educational reforms were accompanied by the approval of the notorious law ‘On the Principles of the State Language Policy’ in 2012 that gave Russian the status of the regional language in those regions where it was spoken by more than 10% of the population. Both adherents of the Russian and Ukrainian language advanced the arguments either in favour or against Russian as the regional language.

For the empirical analysis of the debates on the role of language in educational reforms in Ukraine for the period of 2011-2012, I have chosen two main sources—two blogs section of the news website *Korrespondent* (<http://blogs.korrespondent.net/>) and online newspaper *Ukrainskaya Pravda* (<https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/>)—because they are supposed to be two of the most popular sources of information in the country (Media Landscapes of Eastern Partnership Countries, 2011).

Two main social problems that are articulated and contested in online media space are the perceived discrimination of Russian-speakers in the sphere of education and “the existential threat” to the Ukrainian language. The main point of clash between Internet users is whether Russian or Ukrainian should be protected in Ukraine. Therefore, the main argumentation patterns are constructed along two lines: those who support the reforms of Tabachnyk (i.e. the

Russian language) and those who support Ukrainization of schools. The peculiar feature of the overall discussion is that *Blogs Korrespondent* represents almost exclusively the arguments of those who support the Russian language, whereas journalists, bloggers and ordinary Internet users of *Blogs Ukrainskaya Pravda* tend to articulate the more “pro-Ukrainian” position and favour the idea of Ukrainian as the only state language.

Different groups of claim-makers articulate their interests in Ukrainian online media, including politicians, journalists, and ordinary newsreaders. Based on the classification of the recurrent figures and rhetoric offered by J. Kitsuse and P. Ibarra (2003), it is possible to distinguish *the rhetoric of loss* and *the rhetoric of entitlement* in the selected articles on both websites. The first strategy is used when claim-makers want to stress that some valuable object or state is running the risk of losing value and needs protecting being unable to protect itself. This rhetoric is often expressed in connection with the “threatened” position of the Ukrainian language. *The rhetoric of entitlement* is a linguistic means to claim that everyone should have equal access to resources including public institutions. This strategy is used more often in regard to the “discriminated” position of Russian-speakers who cannot enjoy the full spectrum of rights along with Ukrainian-speakers. Thus, one of the bloggers claims:

It is very sad and bitter that in one part of the United Russian World there is the problem with the most important thing that is the right to study in the native language, to talk freely in that language and get education in the native Russian language (‘Russkiy Yazik v Ukrainskoy Shkole’, September 1, 2012).

Here we see that not only *the rhetoric of entitlement* is expressed by the blogger but it is also emphasized that Russia and Ukraine belong to one part of the bigger “Russian world”; the assumption about the proximity of the Ukrainian and Russian cultures is used in order to construct the notion of language in the sphere of education as an urgent social problem.

The exact opposite opinion is designated in the article published by the blogger Andrey Okara in *Blogs Ukrainskaya Pravda*. In the majority of the comments related to the blog entry, *the rhetoric of loss* is expressed when the threat to Ukrainian is constructed as an “existential threat” to Ukrainian nationhood and democracy. Thus, one of the users stresses:

Every day all Ukrainian is squeezed out of Ukraine. For example, let us take any radio station. What is the main language of broadcasting? Even the host’s surnames are 99% Russian. National interests are losing their position on the legislative level (‘Dmitry Vladimorivich Tabachnik. Welcome to Russia!’, June 1, 2011).

Thus, the following discussion reflects the process of constructing the social problem of the Ukrainian language being under threat of extinction. Consequently, the Ukrainian language is

closely intertwined with the notion of national interests and is the main prerequisite for Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state. In this case, establishing Russian as the regional language and the reforms of Dmitro Tabachnyk aimed at increasing the influence of Russian are constructed as a *threat* to the notion of Ukrainian sovereignty. Moreover, it is stressed that Ukraine can only exist independently when the state language is protected, especially from the influence of the Russian language and “the Russian world”. Thus, Andrey Okara states:

Russian language is a means of communication but it is not a symbol of brother unity [братского единения] and superiority, not as a sign of love for Russia, not as indicator of the greatness of the Russian culture, not as a ticket to the [Russian World], not as a memory of the common past and not as a dream of the common future (‘Dmitry Vladimorivich Tabachnik. Welcome to Russia!’, June 1, 2011).

In contrast to the opinions expressed in *Blogs Korrespondent*, where Russia and Ukraine are often depicted as culturally proximate, the publications and comments in *Blogs Ukrainskaya Pravda* reflect the discussion where Ukraine is constructed as an independent state and, most important, independent from Russian political influence. In this case, the role of Russian is reduced to the language of communication.

The notion of Ukrainian identity is one of the main points of clash between the readers of *Blogs Ukrainskaya Pravda* and *Blogs Korrespondent*. Interestingly, the identity problem of the highly Russified Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine is constantly coming up not only in the publications of 2011-2012, but also after 2014, when the Ukrainian political crisis had reached its culmination. ‘90 % of the people aged 18-35 have Ukrainian ideas in mind, despite the fact that they speak Russian, considering it as a product of Ukraine (but not as Russian property)’ (‘Dvuyazychie dlya Ukraini – blago, a ne vred’, September 9, 2011). Thus, the Ukrainian language is constructed as an important signifier of the Ukrainian culture and, most important, of Ukraine’s survival as the nation and political community.

In contrast to this opinion, one of the *Korrespondent* bloggers Yuri Lipchevskiy claims, ‘historically we were the part of the bigger Russian-speaking space. A lot of Ukrainians identify themselves with Russians or Russian speakers’ (‘Dvuyazychie dlya Ukraini – blago, a ne vred’, September 9, 2011). Further, he expresses *the rhetoric of entitlement*:

We need a new language law. It should provide equal opportunities for the development of Ukrainian citizen and promote equality. Discrimination based on language restricts freedom. It is impossible to be happy talking in a non-native language (‘Dvuyazychie dlya Ukraini – blago, a ne vred’, September 9, 2011).

The common characteristic of the selected materials is that bloggers often accuse the Ukrainian government and politicians of the speculations on the language issue. Ukrainian journalist Yuri Lukshits analyses popular myths regarding the establishment of the second state language and arrives to the conclusion:

Any political force does not need this law [the language law of 2012], this question has been raised only to get some political points; the law will not come into force, and only because the discussion of this law will be raised in order to attract the electorate ('Mifi o Vtorom Gosudarstvennom', June 19, 2013).

The situation in Ukrainian secondary and higher education is often compared to other countries. For instance, Ruslan Bortnik claims that the experience of Canada and Finland can be valuable for Ukraine. In his opinion, both countries succeed in integrating national minorities. For example, in Finland, where there are only 6% Swedes, all opportunities for getting education in their native language are open. Thus, Bortnik claims, 'the project of multilingual education and the politics of multiculturalism is the most appropriate for multicultural and multilingual Ukraine' ('Aspekti Multilingvalnogo Obrazovaniya v Mire: Opyt dlya Ukraini', June 6, 2012). Here the notion of Ukrainian national identity also comes into focus where contemporary Ukraine is depicted as a multilingual and multinational country that should adopt successful international experience.

The controversial reforms in the system of education proposed by the former Minister of Education Dmitro Tabachnyk led to vigorous public debates that is expressed by different discursive strategies, e.g. in *the rhetoric of loss* and *the rhetoric of entitlement*. Both Russian and Ukrainian speakers are constructed as the "victims" of contemporary nationalization politics and the manipulations of Ukrainian politicians. While *Blogs Korrespondent* largely reflects the position of the "victimized" Russian speakers and the argumentation pattern of the necessity to establish Russian as the second state language, the discussions in *Blogs Ukrainskaya Pravda* generate more intense and heated debates on the notions of Ukrainian national identity and language policy that remains a highly contested issue. However, as the subsequent analysis shows, the arguments in favour of Ukrainian and Russian are almost equally distributed in the publications on two websites. In the period of 2013-2015, when the political turbulence in Ukraine reached its peak, the notion of Ukrainian national identity and the balance of power between Russian and Ukrainian has been significantly changed, which will be thoroughly analysed in the next section.

3. Debates on the role of languages in education in Ukraine in 2013-2015

The period of 2013-2015 has become a crucial point in the political development of Ukraine. *Euromaidan* or *the Revolution of Dignity*, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 have raised the question of Ukrainian national identity again. The media space was predominantly occupied by the war on Donbass and the Crimean problem in the period of 2013-2015; however, the debates over the language of education came into focus again. In order to find out the main argumentation patterns and the points of clash related to language policy and education, several news websites will be analysed in the following section.

Novoe Vremya, *Zerkalo Nedeli* and *LiveJournal* are chosen as the main source of empirical material. *Novoe Vremya* (<http://nv.ua>) is a weekly journal and news website that was established in 2014 as an attempt to create an independent and unbiased news website. According to the results of the research, *Novoe Vremya* was among the 15 most visited websites in 2015, along with *Zerkalo Nedeli* (<http://zn.ua>) that was also included in the sample ('NV Opredelilo 15 Samikh Populyarnikh Ukrainiskikh Novostnikh Saitov', December 3, 2015). The discussion on the role of the English language in the sphere of education can be found on <http://Victorshestakov.livejournal.com/> that is also included in the final sample.

The Minister of Education Sergei Kvit supported the President's initiative to make 2016 the year of the English language and referred to Estonian experience where university entrants were supposed to have a good command of English. In his interview, he also touched upon the problem with the Russian language that was expressed in *the rhetoric of loss* in relation to the "vulnerable" and "threatened" position of the state language. In his opinion, Ukrainian is considered as the language under threat:

How to deal with Russian? Well, as with any other language. I do not propose to eliminate it. In the end, there are films and literature. We should take care of all languages but Russian has not suffered so much as Ukrainian, Greek or Crimean Tatar ('Ministr Obrazovaniya Kvit Rasskazal NV, Skol'ko Yazikov Budut Uchit' Ukraintsy i Stanut Li Viktorchevivat' Russkiy', June 9, 2015).

His statement caused a provocative debate on the role of Russian. Thus, one of the users expresses the *rhetoric of entitlement*, but in relation to the "discriminated" position of Russian speakers in Ukraine, 'Russians, congratulate you! We are now a national minority. They even tell that Russians are not oppressed with such an attitude towards Russians and the Russian language!' ('Ministr Obrazovaniya Kvit Rasskazal NV, Skol'ko Yazikov Budut Uchit' Ukraintsy i Stanut Li Viktorchevivat' Russkiy', June 9, 2015).

Another user disagrees with this statement, but refers to the oppression of the Ukrainian language in the Crimea:

Why are you not a national minority? Should we need to praise you like Gods? Why are you oppressed? Oppression is when it is prohibited to talk in Ukrainian in the Crimea, when you are persecuted because of the Ukrainian flag ('Ministr Obrazovaniya Kvit Rasskazal NV, Skol'ko Yazikov Budut Uchit' Ukraintsy i Stanut Li Vikorchevivat' Russkiy', June 9, 2015).

The rhetoric of loss in relation to the Ukrainian language is extensively used in the selected materials. Internet users commenting on both www.nv.ua and www.zn.ua often claim that the state language in Ukraine needs to be protected, being unable to protect itself. Oksana Onischenko, a columnist in *Zerkalo Nedeli*, wrote a provocative article 'Do you speak po-russki?' ['Do you speak Russian?'] that received 422 controversial comments. She emphasizes that the Ukrainian government should pay meticulous attention to the state language and protect it.

One of the participants of the debate expresses *the rhetoric of unreason* by considering the governmental measures to support education in Ukrainian as "*deliberate Ukrainization*" that is considered to be useless and harmful for the Ukrainian political development. In response to this opinion, another user expresses *the rhetoric of loss* in relation to the Ukrainian language:

Where do you see Ukrainization? The number of hours for the Ukrainian language are constantly reduced, Ukrainian schools are closed or they are converted to the Russian language of instruction, Ukrainian mass media and publishing are abolished ('Do you Speak Po-russki?', February 7, 2015).

These statements cited above represent a typical *argumentation pattern* where the existential threat to Ukrainian and, thus, to national survival and national identity, is constructed in the public discourse of Ukrainian online media. Moreover, Ukraine is constructed as the only legitimate places where the state languages can be developed and spoken and, consequently, should be protected by the state.

Another *argumentation pattern* that appears quite often in the selected publications is connected with the role of the Russian language that has also become a point of clash in the Internet discussions. While Ukrainian is constructed as a key element of Ukrainian nation-building, Russian is described as a means of communication and an important factor in economic development of the country and personal success. *The argumentation pattern* that is expressed in Ukrainian media is that Russian deserves a higher status in Ukraine because it is a native language for millions of Ukrainians. 'The Russian language should become the state

language. Russian is a real prospect and is not invented by some obscure strangers' ('Do you Speak Po-russki?', February 7, 2015).

The intensification of the public debates on language policy happened in 2014-2015 when the newly elected President of Ukraine Petr Poroshenko proposed to give a special status to the English language and to eliminate the duplication of the records in the Russian language in Ukrainian passports. As it is stated in the article 'Instead of Russian. Poroshenko proposed to give a special status to English', published on www.nv.ua, 'Poroshenko noted that English should become the main foreign language in the system of education' ('Vmesto Russkogo. Poroshenko Predlozhil Dat' Osobiyy Status Angliiskomu Yaziku', October 3, 2014). For this purpose, he proposed that 2016 should be notified as the year of the English language. Moreover, he supported the idea to eliminate the duplication of the passport records in Russian:

I support Ukrainian people's indignation to the duplication of the information in the Ukrainian passport in the language of the state that is officially recognized by the Verkhovna Rada as acting aggressively against Ukraine. Taking into account the patriotic position of the people signed the petition as well as the inclination of the Ukrainian society to integrate into the European Union; I consider that all records made in Russian should be substituted by the records in English as the language of international communication ('Inglizhizatsia Ukraini v chest svobodi ot dostoinstva', November 22, 2015).

The fact that Poroshenko raised the question of English certainly demonstrates that, at least, political leaders, are trying to question the future of Ukraine. For them, English has become a way of distancing from the Russian aggression and politics and a means of integrating into Europe. This trend is also observable in the continuous analysis of the online discussions on education in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. In this statement, Ukrainian national identity is constructed in the strong opposition to the Russian politics where Russian is articulated as the language of the *occupying country*. Moreover, the increase in the national consciousness and patriotism of Ukrainians are seen as important prerequisites of the Ukrainian integration into the EU; Europe also serves as the focal point and a particular system of political values that form Ukrainian nationhood after Euromaidan. This conclusion corresponds to the results of the research project led by V. Kulyk (2015) who proved:

In terms of self-reported change in attitudes "over the last year," respondents in 2014 reported having better feelings about the Ukrainian language, with 35 percent reporting at least some change for the better and only 6 percent feeling a change for the worse.

The "Europeanization" tendency is finely illustrated by the statement of Oksana Onischenko who claims that 'I am not against the Russian language. I am in favour of Ukrainian. And I am

for European prospects' ('Do you Speak Po-ruski?', February 7, 2015). Thus, Ukrainian is constructed not only as a key marker in national identity but also a necessary prerequisite for entering Europe.

The discussion of Poroshenko's proposal to establish English as the main working language in education can be also found on *LiveJournal*. Viktor Shestakov (<http://viktorshestakov.livejournal.com/>) critically examines the President's initiative in his article 'Anglicization of Ukraine' and claims that it is a new fraud scheme proposed by Poroshenko within the framework of the state Russophobe politics. The blogger is extremely critical about the outcome of the reform; further in the text he states; 'now the citizen of Ukraine are immersed in the severe economic crisis where the foremost question is the issue of survival and not the language' ('Inglizhizatsia Ukraini v chest svobodi ot dostoinstva', November 22, 2015).

Ukrainian sources selected for my analysis (*Zerkalo Nedeli*, *Novoe Vremya* and *LiveJournal*) represent an excellent example of how different discursive and rhetorical strategies are used to construct the issue of language policy as a social problem in Ukrainian discourse. The Ukrainian case of social problems construction is definitely unique and challenging, since the contradictory claims about two main languages are expressed by different groups of the population. As the subsequent analysis shows, the claims about Ukrainian-speakers' discrimination are often articulated by the politicians and officials who are supposed to play the role of problem bearers and to be responsible for resolving the problems articulated by other groups of the population who are not in power (for instance, Russian-speakers' perceived discrimination). In the case of the exclusive claims about either Russian- or Ukrainian-speakers' discrimination, politicians' role is not limited to responding the claims; they also act as claim-makers when the discussion is linked to the problem of the state language.

Thus, the question whether Russian or Ukrainian should be protected in Ukraine remains the main point of clash between the discussants. Cultural and, consequently, political boundaries between "Russians" and "Ukrainians" are constantly redrawn and reflect the main argumentation patterns regarding the use of languages. Thus, the Ukrainian language is constructed as a key marker of national identity and national survival and a chance for entering the European Union; Ukraine is often portrayed as the only legitimate place on the planet where Ukrainian can be preserved, while Russian is perceived as either a means of communication or the language of the *occupying country* and the threat to Ukrainian unity and political stability.

The overall analysis reflects also the rise of the patriotic moods and nationalist arguments in favour of Ukrainian as the only state language, especially in comparison with the period of 2011-2012, where the arguments of the ‘Slavic brotherhood’ were still present in the public discourse. Anti-Russian sentiments and reorientation towards the West (i.e. English at schools and universities) are the main characteristic of the overall discussion of the educational initiatives in the period of 2013-2015.

4. Public debates on the adoption of the new language laws in 2017

Since 2013 when *the Revolution of Dignity* and the subsequent Russian aggression took place, the course of the political development in Ukraine continues to attract meticulous attention of international academia and politicians who attempt to investigate the changes in self-perception of Ukrainians and understanding of Ukraine’s legitimate place in the world. After 2013-2014 when the language problems were fuelled by the military intervention of the Russian troops and an attempt to abolish the 2012 language law, the period of 2017 has become a turning point in the overall discussion of Ukrainian language policy and national identity. In January 2017, the deputies of *the Verkhovna Rada* initiated the discussion of the three language drafts aimed at the stable increase of the role of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life. Since 2014, when the deputies tried to abolish the notorious law of Kivalov-Kolesnichenko which provided regional status for the Russian language in several Ukrainian regions, the public debates that took place in 2017 have become the first fully-fledged attempt to rearrange the new language order in the rapidly changing political environment in Ukraine. Ukrainian deputies registered three laws, No. 5556, 5669 and 5670, aimed at ‘protecting the public status of the Ukrainian language, societal integration and strengthening the state and territorial unity of Ukraine’. Moreover, the deputies proposed to establish a special institution that will punish those whose level of Ukrainian is insufficient. In its essence, this organization is similar to the Language Inspection in Estonia and the Centre for the State Language in Latvia.

The reforms of the legislation of the language use went further—in September 2017, the President of Ukraine proposed to introduce Ukrainian as the only language of instruction at schools of national minorities, which polarized the Ukrainian society and caused an extremely negative reaction of some European politicians. Altogether, these important decisions in the sphere of language use and education have subdivided the country into two “camps” and

intensified the debates in the public. The debates analysed in this section cover overall Ukrainization efforts discussed above, including the sphere of education.

Social media, news websites and blogs have become a platform for intense public discussions of the new wave of Ukrainization proposed by politicians. I have chosen two websites for further empirical investigation: news website *Novoe Vremya* (<http://nv.ua/>) and *Blogs Korrespondent* (<http://blogs.korrespondent.net/>). The decision to focus on these particular websites is determined by two criteria: *the diversity of publications* and *media coverage*. These two sources offered a large number of articles, comments, and experts' opinions on the new language laws and educational reforms and covered a great variety of opinions and arguments that will be studied carefully in the following section. The analysed period includes all publications from January 2017 until the end of September 2017 when the most heated debates took place.

Generally speaking, the analysis of both websites indicates the dominance of the comments and articles in favour of the state language, proving the growing tendency of the Ukrainian language 'victimization' which became extremely visible after 2013. However, despite the overwhelming dominance of the arguments in favour of the state language, some statements that support the Russian language were also marked out in the selected materials.

Social actors who articulate that the problem of the Ukrainian language exists in the society include various groups such as politicians, experts, journalists and ordinary Internet users who posted their comments on the news websites. For instance, the interview with the authors of the language laws was published on <http://nv.ua/> where Andrey Teteruk, the member of the party 'People's Front' claims, 'Ukrainian is the state language of the country. Public institutions must provide an opportunity to communicate and keep the records in the state language. That is absolutely normal' ('Mova-emigrant: Parlament perevisyvayet zakon o yazyke – Pochemu poshel shkval negodovaniya i sporov?', January 23, 2017).

Thus, purpose of this argument is to emphasize the central role of Ukrainian in all spheres of public life and claim that the state language is the guarantee of societal integration and unity. Moreover, the knowledge of the state language is constructed as a means of national and cultural survival of Ukraine. For instance, Yaroslav Ageyenko, an ordinary Internet user, states, 'there will be no Ukraine without the Ukrainian language, culture, history and identity' ('Mova-emigrant: Parlament perevisyvayet zakon o yazyke – Pochemu poshel shkval negodovaniya i sporov?', January 23, 2017).

In some of the statements, the language is understood not only as a key marker of national identity but also as an effective method of preserving the territorial and political integrity, mainly from the influence of Russia. Thus, one of the users stresses:

The state should have only one language. And it is simply the self-preservation instinct because the existence of several state languages can become a reason for aggression (the mechanisms are well-known and well-argued). You can communicate in different languages but there should be only one state language. Moreover, the language should be unique, so that nobody will encroach on it. And this language is Ukrainian ('Yazykovoy Zakon: prodolzhaite pomogat' Kremlyu', January 25, 2017).

Some of the visitors of <http://blogs.korrespondent.net/> also use *the rhetoric of loss* in relation to the 'weak' and 'vulnerable' position of the state language in Ukraine. For instance, one of the Internet users argues:

All civilized nations try to protect their languages. Russian is not despised in Ukraine; people speak it even better than Ukrainian. The state language of Ukraine is Ukrainian, and, therefore, the main duty of Ukrainians is to speak their language ('Yazikovoy vopros: chem gordites', devochki?', September 12, 2017).

The frequent use of this argumentation pattern indicates that many Ukrainians feel that the position of the state language is "threatened" and that the state needs to focus on preserving the unique cultural identity and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Thus, the state language is understood as a means of uniting the country.

Like those social actors who argue that Ukrainian-speakers' rights are infringed in Ukraine, the second group of claim-makers admits exactly the opposite—total Ukrainization of the public space is the violation of the rights of Russian-speakers. For instance, one of the top experts of *Blogs Korrespondent* Viktor Medvedchuk argues:

And then, what should we do with the Constitution of Ukraine, its tenth article, which "guarantees the free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities"? This is the most outrageous example of replacing the force of the law by the right of the force ('Pochemu USA nraivitsya prinyatiy VR zakon ob obrazovanii', September 13, 2017).

This opinion is supported by the Ukrainian deputy Evgeniy Muraev who stresses:

We are the "patchwork", multinational, whose borders had always been created by our neighbours. Only 26 years ago different nationalities with different languages and religions voted for united, independent Ukraine. And now these people and their descendants are trampled into the dirt and are told that they are "pseudo-Ukrainians" ('Na yazike nasiliya', May 23, 2017).

The metaphor of “patchwork” used to emphasize the multinational character of contemporary Ukraine illustrates a more inclusive view of Ukraine that respects the rights of Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers and other minority groups.

This inclusive view of the Ukrainian nation is shared by some visitors of the news website *Novoe Vremya*. Thus, one of the users stresses that:

Ukraine is a bilingual country, the same situation exists in many countries. And if I have the right to know and to speak Ukrainian, I will also demand the right to communicate in Russian. The hatred towards the Russian aggressor should not be transferred to the language and its speakers – it is the right way to the collapse of the country (‘Razgovor na ravnykh’, January 29, 2017).

The statements mentioned above are used in order to claim that Russian-speakers should have equal access to resources including public institutions along with Ukrainian-speakers.

In contrast to those claim-makers who argue that Russian-speakers’ rights are violated in Ukraine, the opposite side of the discursive conflict applies a more exclusive vision of Ukrainian national identity. The characteristic feature of the claims about the special protection of Ukrainian made by politicians, experts, journalists, Internet users etc. is the discursive opposition of Russia and Ukraine which has become even more visible since 2015. As some of the arguments mentioned above illustrate, Ukrainization is understood by this group of claim-makers as an attempt of decommunization. Thus, Russia is often depicted as a ‘backward’, ‘totalitarian’ country and, consequently, Russian as the remnant of the Soviet regime that oppressed everything Ukrainian. For instance, user Vadim Schutskiy stresses:

Actually Russian is nothing more than a vestige of the Soviet and imperial eras. There is no practical interest in it. Nowadays the practical interest lies in the knowledge of English (more and more information published in this language). The legislation should require to learn Ukrainian as the state language and not to impose Russian (‘Pochemu ukraintsev tak volnuet yazikovoy vopros’, February 1, 2017).

This opinion is shared by Ukrainian writer Andrey Bondar’ who reflects on the future path of Ukraine’s political development. Further, he argues:

Is not it enough reason to be optimistic that we have found the strength to overthrow the authoritarian government, is it? And our three-year confrontation with one of the most dangerous empires in this dirty war – is not it the reason for further optimism? (‘Net nikakogo tretyego puti, nel’zya zhit’ v koridore. Pisatel’ Andrey Bondar’ – o meste Ukraini v mire’, March 1, 2017).

In these statements, it is stressed that the political and cultural trajectories of Russia and Ukraine are totally different. This view prevails in the selected materials, especially in the articles and comments published on <http://nv.ua/>. In comparison with 2012, when the arguments about

“brother unity” were still present in the overall debates on language policy and education, the analysis of the publications in 2017 reveals the clear dominance of the anti-Russian sentiments, which is clear and understandable in the situation of the military confrontation and information war between two countries. Some users even insist on the ideological opposition of Russian and Ukraine. For instance, one of the readers of *Novoe Vremya* claims:

We must articulate in our society and understand that the conflict is not language-based but value-based. If we talk about our neighbour, the things done by the Russian government are unacceptable – organizing bloody battles by the mass applause of its fellow citizens. And that is not the question of language, it is the issue of values ('Yazykovoy Zakon: prodolzhaite pomogat' Kremlyu', January 25, 2017).

Thus, Russian is attributed the “barbarian” values characteristic for the empires; on the contrary, Ukraine is depicted as a “truly European”, non-aggressive nation. This essentialized view of the Ukrainian values is widespread among the comments in the analysed discussion.

Recent Ukrainization efforts in the sphere of education have attracted meticulous attention from European politicians and Ukrainian experts. The proclaimed aim of the educational reforms is to increase the use of the state language at schools of national minorities. This initiative caused an ambiguous public reaction. For example, Viktor Medvedchuk tries to construct the “threat” to Ukraine’s unity and territorial integrity by oppressing Russian and other language of national minorities. Further, he claims:

According to the experts’ opinions, discrimination on the basis of language will lead to total ignorance and fuel the confrontation in the society. The new education law is launching an irreversible process of destroying the integrity of the Ukrainian nation-state, because the Ukrainian language will be doomed without Russian and interaction with other minority languages ('Pochemu USA nraivitsya prinyatiy VR zakon ob obrazovanii', September 13, 2017).

Both statements mentioned above illustrate that Russian acts as the guarantee of Ukraine’s survival as a nation and its integrity. This view is opposite to the one expressed by claim-makers who construct the problem of the Ukrainian language. The latter consider Ukrainian as an integral part of the nation-building project and the prerequisite for Ukraine’s political stability and unity.

The education law aimed at complete Ukrainization of schools of ethnic minorities led to the intense public debates among European politicians. Many Ukrainian bloggers refer to the principles of European democracies in order to criticize the governmental initiative. For example, Medvedchuk cites the words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary who admits:

Ukraine has betrayed Hungary by making amendments in the education law that severely violates the rights of the Hungarian minority. It is extremely shameful that the country that seeks to develop closer ties with the European Union made the decision which in the total opposition to European values ('Pochemu USA nraivitsya prinyatiy VR zakon ob obrazovanii', September 13, 2017).

In the above statement, Ukraine is constructed as a non-democratic state that ignores the rights of other minority groups and is discursively opposed to the image of 'true' Europe that is supposed to be multinational, multilingual and respectful to all cultural and linguistic groups. This view is supported by the Ukrainian priest who published his opinion on <http://blogs.korrespondent.net/>. Thus, he argues that 'it may seem strange but all these laws directly contradict the European integration course of Ukraine. In Europe, it is normal to give maximum freedom in using the languages of national minorities' ('Pochemu bez russkogo yazika Ukraina mozhet prevratitsya v stranu Sharikovikh', February 20, 2017).

The overall discussion of the Ukrainization laws in the sphere of education and mass media reflects the existence of two conflicting discourses of language policy. On the one hand, the significant proportion of the articles and comments published in *Novoe Vremya* and *Blogs Korrespondent* reflects a growing tendency of the support for the Ukrainian language as a key marker of national identity and the holder of the state sovereignty and political independence. On the other hand, the sentiments about Russian-speakers' discrimination are still present in the public discourse on language policy, aggravated by the adoption of the education law aimed at complete Ukrainization of the schools of national minorities. Both sides of the discursive conflict are represented by various groups of claim-makers including politicians, experts, artists, clergymen, European organizations and ordinary Internet users. Two groups argue about the legitimate place of their community in Ukraine, the perception of Ukraine in the world, the role and status of both languages and Ukraine's identity. Those who express the nationalist arguments in favour of Ukrainian as the only state language often view Russian as the "language of aggressors" that needs to be eliminated from Ukrainian public space and exploit a more exclusive view of the nation based on the knowledge of the state language. For them, Ukrainian *Europeanness* is associated with respect for Ukrainian, and Ukraine is constructed as a "truly" European nation-state. The second group of claim-makers employs a totally different view—they consider knowledge of Russian as an important cultural and economic asset and construct the image of Russian-speakers as the discriminated group of the society. They create a more inclusive model of the Ukrainian nation with the idea of *Europeanness* based on the recognition of Russian and other languages of ethnic minorities.

Conclusion

The system of secondary and higher education serves as an important channel for translating the politics of nationalizing state, referring to the theory of nationalism elaborated by Rogers Brubaker (1996). That is why the debates on the state language and the language of instruction at schools and universities occupy such a significant place in post-Soviet Ukraine where the political transition from the totalitarian Soviet system to the democratic one has been extremely painful. The present article has focused on the public debates surrounding the educational reforms introduced by Dmytro Tabachnyk in 2011-2012, and the subsequent discussion on the role of languages in 2013-2015 and in 2017 in Ukraine. These periods were chosen deliberately in order to trace the changing perception of Ukrainian national identity and the evolution of the discourse of language policy. Although the article has concentrated exclusively on the Russian-language blogs and news websites and did not aim at covering the Ukrainian-language sources, the overall discussion reflects the main points of clash between two groups of claim-makers who articulate the conflicting claims about either Ukrainian or Russian-speakers' discrimination in Ukraine. Thus, the main argumentation lines are built upon the attitudes towards both languages. The English language has also become the point of reference in many articles, especially in the period of 2014-2015, when Petr Poroshenko proposed to introduce English as a working language in Ukrainian education.

The analysis included debates of different online media, including *LiveJournal*, *Blogs Korrespondent*, *Blogs Ukrainskaya Pravda*, *Zerkalo Nedeli* and *Novoe Vremya*. In the course of analysis, the article reaches a conclusion that *the rhetoric of loss* and *the rhetoric of entitlement* are the main strategies of constructing the issue of language policy as an urgent social and political problem, in terms of J. Kitsuse and P. Ibarra's (2003) classification of language (vernacular) games. However, the first strategy is used predominantly by those social actors who construct the problem of the Ukrainian language and claim that the state language needs the special protection from the state. *The rhetoric of entitlement* is expressed by the second group of claim-makers represented by those who claim that the problem of Russian-speakers' discrimination exists in the Ukrainian society. These strategies are marked out in all analysed periods of 2011-2012, 2013-2015 and 2017.

The subsequent analysis of the publications reveals the growing tendency of Ukrainian-speakers' "victimization". Unlike in 2011-2012, when the arguments in favour of Ukrainian

and Russian were almost equally distributed in the publications, the blog entries and articles published on Ukrainian news websites after 2013 reflect the dramatic shift towards understanding Ukrainian-speakers as the group being discriminated in its own national state. The dominance of the anti-Russian sentiments that tend to depict Russian as a “backward”, “imperial remnant” of the Soviet Union and the arguments that favour Ukrainian as the one and the only state language are the peculiar feature of the public discourse of language policy after 2013. In these materials, the Ukrainian language serves not only as a key marker of national identity and a means of political independence, but also as a chance for better “European prospects” and the clear sign of Ukrainian *Europeanness*. In this case, protection of the Ukrainian national interests and language is constructed as an inevitable part of the nation-building process and in strong opposition to the Russian language. In contrast to this view, those who claim that Russian-speakers and other minority groups are discriminated in Ukraine construct a more inclusive view of the nation and often refer to the principles of European democracies. They claim that Ukraine cannot be regarded as a legitimate part of the “Western world” when the rights of ethnic minorities are severely violated. Thus, the overall discussion reflects the existence of two conflicting discourses of language policy in the Russian-language online media in Ukraine. In this sense, the system of education has become one of the most powerful tools of nation-building and is often reformed in order to suit the dominant political project.

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Power-sharing or Ethnic Domination? Ethnic Representation in the Republics of Russia in the Late 2000s - Early 2010s

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Abstract

The paper explores political representation of the major ethnic groups in the republics of Russia, in order to elucidate the role of ethnicity in regional politics under an authoritarian turn in the late 2000s - early 2010s. To assess quantitative data, the study develops a model to analyse patterns of ethnic representation. The data analysis demonstrates that, at least in some republics, ethnicity was among the major principles in power distribution and regional regimes seem to have relied in managing diversity largely on either ethnic domination or on regional power-sharing. Based on a structural approach, the structural factors that contributed to these outcomes are analysed, taking into account a range of variables that characterize the ethnic situations of the republics and their political regimes. The findings of this study point at the persistence of ethnic representation as a practice in the formation of the republics' officialdoms under the authoritarian regime.

Keywords: ethnic representation; power-sharing; ethnic domination; ethnic republics; Russian Federation

Following the parade of sovereignties, 21 republics, 10 autonomous districts and an autonomous region were established as forms of territorial self-governance of their 'titular

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nation(alitie)s' alongside regular ('non-ethnic') federation units in the early 1990s (Zamyatin, 2016: 25-27). 'Titular' ethnic elites became dominant in the leadership of many republics. The recentralization of the 2000s reduced the republics' autonomy and by the 2010s resulted in the demise of federalism. Did 'titular' elites still remain dominant in the republics? To shed light on the access of elites to power in ethnic republics of Russia in the late 2000s – early 2010s, this study aims at quantitatively assessing the level of ethnic representation in the republics' top officialdom.

The period of the late 2000s – early 2010s is interesting for study, because substitution of the last Yeltsin-era heavy-weight heads of republics with the new ones in 2010 had its impact also on power distribution in republics without significantly disturbing the equilibrium in ethnic representation. Since autumn 2015, several heads of republics were arrested during the anticorruption campaign or otherwise sacked and substituted for 'outsiders', which might have marked a new era in regional ethnopolitics, when the role of ethnicity as a consideration in appointments diminished. In this study, the ruling groups that are under exploration are those that occupied formal positions in the 2007/2011-2011/2015 electoral cycle: the precise years vary among the republics.

What patterns of ethnic representation emerged in the republics? In the first part, the paper will present the data of a comparative study of ethnic representation across republics. Hanna Pitkin identified among the dimensions of political representation descriptive and substantive representation (Pitkin, 1967). This study assesses ethnic representation operationalized as a 'descriptive representation', when the ethnic identity of public officials and politicians is taken as an indicator of representation that substitutes their standing for the group interests. The assessment of substantial representation, when the representatives also act in relation to particular interests of an ethnic group, is not taken in the scope of this study, *inter alia*, because the analysis does not focus on the outcomes of the political process, such as passing legislation on ethnic issues.

In focus of the analysis is the contrast between the shares of the titular and the Russian populations and their representation in the parliaments and governments of the republics. I will use the combination of positional and biographical approaches of the elite theory to study the information on ethnic background of elected deputies and government officials attainable in open sources and available expert reports. An unavoidable shortcoming of the option of studying descriptive representation is that only a probabilistic argument can be made, because the representatives may act only out of their own interests, as portrayed in instrumentalist

accounts. Further, given the context-specific character of ethnic allegiances, there is a danger of essentializing ethnicity by overstating the deepness of ethnic cleavages and divisions among the elites and in the populations.

For many ethnic groups in Russia, social cohesion is enhanced by the processes of assimilation that make ethnic identities less salient and the issue of ethnic representation less relevant. Ethnic issues were central to the political agenda only in some republics and often only at the time of major events, such as the adoption of their constitutions, but also then ethnic elites rarely acted as a consolidated force. More often, regional elites competed and reached a coalition of the second-order sub-elite groups or even ‘clans’, where ethnicity was one among the binding principles (Salagaev and Sergeev, 2013). Usually the divide between ‘titular’ and ‘Russian’ segments of regional elites had less political salience than their belonging to the ‘party of power’ united under the regional leader. In this study, the different segments of regional political elites that acted as ‘representatives of their people’, proposing their solutions to ethnic and linguistic issues at the time of critical junctures, are conventionally referred to, accordingly, as ‘titular elites’ vs ‘Russian (regional) elites’ (Zamyatin, 2015: 352).

The study will develop a model to systematize and analyse the patterns of representation and hypothesize about the state of ethnic relations in individual republics that these data reveal. Throughout the post-Soviet period, Russia pursued a combination of approaches to diversity management, but since the 2010s there was a clear shift in the predominant strategy from accommodation to integration and assimilation (Zamyatin, 2016: 43-44). Ethnic republics themselves are the pillar of the accommodationist approach. Russia’s federal design significantly restricted their jurisdiction to manage diversity through the creation of the political institutions based on ethnicity, but up to the 2010s the Kremlin rarely interfered directly into regional ethnic politics.

Thus, the republics settled the issue of ethnic representation at the level of informal practices, which makes categorization difficult. In Russian public discourse, the phenomena of varying ‘regional approaches to diversity management’ remains unnamed. Many elite members themselves continue to share essentialist beliefs about ethnic identities that are implicit in the vocabulary of political discourse. As part of the nationalist rhetoric, some politicians characterized the overrepresentation of the titular elites in republics as ‘ethnocracy’. This concept is ideologically charged and faulty in semantics: the substitution of ‘demos’ with ‘ethnos’ does not work, because of the central role of elites in regional politics.

I will hypothesize about regional approaches based only on the analysis of the quantitative data and will not qualitatively substantiate the conceptualization, which remains a matter for further research. I will not invent new categories but, instead, will employ with some qualifications the existing terms like ‘minority inclusion’, ‘power-sharing’ or ‘domination’ for designating the approaches not as normative but only as *descriptive categories* (for a similar classification of forms of minority representation see Bieber, 2010).

Power-sharing and domination are the opposite approaches, while inclusion is a category to depict in-between cases. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the first is a democratic and the second an authoritarian approach. The most famous form of power-sharing that was proposed as a democratic strategy of conflict resolution in an ethnically divided society is consociationalism developed by Arend Lijphart (1977). However, authoritarian regimes also rely on power-sharing to ensure their stability. Similarly, domination is pursued both under the democratic and authoritarian rule (McGarry, 2010: 37). Further, the approaches have both a vertical dimension in the context of the centre-periphery relations and a horizontal dimension in regional politics. I will only study the horizontal non-institutionalized arrangements in republics that amounted to domination or tacit agreements that envisaged regional executive power-sharing (O’Leary, 2008; Bieber, 2010).

Why might certain patterns of ethnic representation have emerged? From the constructivist perspective, ‘instrumentalist’ thinkers see interests and human agency as the driving force of identity construction, and ‘institutionalists’ argue that the social structures create identities. Arguably, the agency factors are more characteristic of the Russian ethno-politics in the periods of the 1990s and 2000s, when the role of ethnic mobilization and ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’ was decreasing with the progress of the state-building from its stages of sovereignization and decentralization to recentralization, while the establishment of superpresidentialism also in the republics conditioned their specific of party politics and ethnic voting, intra-elite competition and network effects. Thus, structural factors are crucial for study of regional ethno-politics in the period of the late 2000s – early 2010s.

Hence, in the second part, the paper will analyse the data patterns based on the cleavage structure theory that seeks to explain political outcomes by the character of identity divisions in society, whether the population is divided into complementary or cross-cut identity groups. Cross-cutting cleavages are said to enhance social cohesion and reinforcing cleavages contributes to the political salience of ethnic identities, producing more segmented societies (Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 1985). The study will explore how the levels of ethnic representation

depended on some structural variables that characterize the ethnic situations of the republics and their political regimes. A low level of political competition largely contributed to domination, and a higher competition contributed to power-sharing.

1. Ethnicity and representation

1.1 Approaches and difficulties in studying representation

In the early 2000s, the Kremlin started ‘federal reforms’ that aimed at the recentralization of the state through building the ‘vertical of power’ and resulted in a decline of federalism in Russia. The ‘institutionalist’ understanding that the existence of ‘ethnic institutions’, such as the republics themselves, reinforces alternative ethno-national identities justified the accompanying nation-building efforts. The depoliticization of ethnicity and its removal from the public domain included the abolishment or at least deformatization of the professional requirements of language knowledge and other ethnic institutions (Zamyatin, 2016: 36-38). While indication of one’s ethnic self-identification was preserved in the population censuses, the practice of official monitoring of the data on ethnic identity in virtually all other public contexts was stopped. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, the relevance of ethnicity in the political context persists, although it varies from one republic to another. By definition, a blind spot of the institutionalist approach in studying ethnic phenomena is that it does not provide tools to explore informal practices in ‘cadre policy’.

How is it still possible to study the ethnicity of members of the ruling groups? In general, the data on the ethnic background of the first figures in the regions is typically publicly known. So is the data on ethnicity of the second, third and fourth positions of government head, chairman of legislature and mayor of the capital city. In part of executive officials and civil servants, the data on ethnic representation in individual republics and other regions is often collected by the authorities, but rarely disclosed, because, especially since the 2000s, it is viewed as politically sensitive and potentially inhibiting for ‘inter-ethnic accord’. When accessible, practically no sources give a systematic set of data that could be used for comparisons across regions. The compilation of the dataset is the practical task of the current study.

A further complication is that the 1990s were characterized by a frequent change of regional leadership, with the exception of some heads of the republics in power for over two decades until mid-2000s up to 2010. At the lower stories of the apparatus, regular change of

deputies after serving their terms and the rotation of government officials, especially among the ministers, was also typical. It would be possible to produce a meaningful set of data for any given moment but not a dynamic picture which would be patchy by the lack of similarity in data. It makes more sense to go beyond everyday politics and give a snapshot of the recent situation and then to interpret the patterns from a long-time perspective.

Similarly, representation assessed solely by one's formal position in the institutional structure incompletely stands for one's political clout, because the importance of informal power networks grew over time behind the façade of institutions. Nevertheless, this is a sufficient indicator for the purpose of this study which is based on the assumption that ethnic segments of elites were similarly represented in formal and informal networks.

The distinction between formal and informal ethnic representation is meaningful also because typically domination was camouflaged by the appointment of at least some minority representatives to formal positions to emphasize the political representativeness and responsiveness of the ruling groups even if in reality domination was sustained, often through informal channels. At the same time, informal networks could enhance ethnic representation because these included trusted persons from one's earlier career stages. For example, for titular representatives these were often rural career paths. This study did not take the task of following this distinction because some fluctuation in representation creates noise in the data but does not disrupt the patterns that tended to be at the margins of the scale ending either in domination or power-sharing. A more nuanced approach to reveal the layers of formal and informal ethnic representation remains a topic for further research.

1.2 Methods and focus groups

One method that provides a shortcut for a first approximation of ethnic representation in an authoritarian situation is to focus on studying the ethnic background of the chief executives. However, the balanced appointment practice was often preserved also under the strong presidencies at the lower stories of the state apparatus. Thus, another method is to identify the ethnic background of members of the ruling groups, including regional parliamentarians, heads of regional executive authorities, and sometimes also heads of municipalities. While parliamentarians are usually under public scrutiny, less available in open sources is the data on ethnicity of the other two categories of public officials.

A further complication regarding heads of executive authorities and agencies is whether one should focus exclusively on the study of the ethnic background of the prime-minister and ministers or also on deputy prime-ministers and deputy ministers as well as heads of governmental agencies. A wider focus would make sense, because the latter categories qualify as 'leading officials' and, thus, members of the ruling groups. When forming the regional government and ministries, the principle of proportional representation of the major groups is often observed along other considerations. For example, posts of minister and first deputy minister would be shared between individuals representing the largest groups. Another advantage of a wider focus is that this way the cluster of the executive branch would be roughly of the same size as that for the legislature, which, according to the 2010 federal law, had to be standardized across the regions in the following electoral cycle. Thus, a wider focus would have made comparisons more consistent.

However, deputy prime-ministers and deputy ministers are a much less public group and their ethnic background is often not disclosed, which makes a cross-regional study near to impossible. In addition, the cabinet as a collected body includes only heads of executive authorities. Heads of executive authorities and their deputies do not have equal standing, and in some places the ethnic background of the heads of authorities might be a sufficient indicator representing the lower stories, also because in some contexts s/he might hire a team consisting of co-ethnics. Further, a significant part among the regional government members are heads of branches of the federal authorities, including law-enforcement agencies, where proportionality is far less observed by default due to their rotation from other regions and members of the titular group are typically less represented. The same is valid in regard to the judicial authorities that are in the federal competence and, thus, not in the focus of this study.

A study focus on an ethnic background of municipal elites would have made sense, because this level is the closest to the population and governing bodies tend to resemble its ethnic composition the most. Regional capital cities are typically well-to-do entities and have the bulk of the regional population. For that reason, some sources list head of capital city among the first officials of republics. Titular populations in some republics traditionally reside in rural areas, while the Russians often are in the majority in the capital city. However, the factual subordination of municipalities to regional authorities signified a virtual lack of local self-government. Thus, a mechanic summation of municipal elites with other regional elites misrepresents the overall structure of the ruling groups in these republics.

The second method is suitable for exploring the balance of power both under democratic conditions with its representation of many group interests, and under an authoritarian regime, because the principle of ethnic representation tends to be proliferated from chief executives downwards to the level of heads and deputy heads in the executive branch, and often even among the public servants. In practice, this study produces data on two dozen ministers in some republics and the data on three or four dozen ministers and heads of government agencies (when available, also their deputies) in some other republics. Despite this varying volume, the shares are comparable, because ethnic representation does not presumably differ in ministries and government agencies. Thus, this study uses the combination of the two methods.

1.3 Sources and the data on ethnic representation

The major source of the data are reports of regional experts based on open sources and available from publications of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. A semi-official source (Romanov and Stepanov, 2013) is the closest there is to a systematized set, but the method is not explained, only shares are given and no raw data is presented to cross-check the calculation. The publication lopsidedly tends to underestimate the share of ethnic Russians among the elites, overemphasizing titular overrepresentation, but interprets overrepresentation of the Russian elites as a natural order of things. It is not explicitly stated which segment was included into the ruling group in focus, but one can deduce that these were regional parliamentarians, ministers and heads of municipalities. For example, analysing the data on ethnic background of the ruling group of Tatarstan, three clusters of elites were given and, inter alia, 24% of ethnic Russians were marked among parliamentarians. This is outdated data, as the accurate data on the number of ethnic Russian parliamentarians in Tatarstan for the period should be 32% (Tishkov and Stepanov, 2013b: 87).

The data for the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District originate mostly from Tishkov and Stepanov (2013a), for Chechnya and Ingushetia from Kosikov (2012) and for Kabardin-Balkaria from Tishkov and Stepanov (2010) and Tenov and Atlaskirov (2014). The data on the two republics of the Southern Federal District originate for Adygea after the 2006 elections from Golosov (2012) and Ivanov (2007) and for Kalmykia from Ulinova (2011). Only the data on deputies of the republics of the Volga and North-Western Federal Districts are available for Bashkortostan and Tatarstan from Tishkov and Stepanov (2013b), for Udmurtia from Tishkov and Stepanov (2013c), for Mari El from Zamyatin (2015), for Mordovia from my

analysis based on official data, and only on titular deputies for Komi from Tishkov and Stepanov (2009) and for Karelia from the data officially presented at the 7th Congress of the Karelian People (2013). The data on Chuvashia, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan are discussed in the next section. For the lack of other data, the unreliable aggregated data from Romanov and Stepanov (2013) is used on the share of the ethnic Russians among the ruling groups in Udmurtia, Mari El, Mordovia and Bashkortostan. The available data on the republics of the Far East and Siberian Federal Districts are for Buryatia, Sakha (Yakutia) and Tuva from Ochirova (2011) and for Khakassia and Altay from Ivanov (2007).

The accumulated data set on the numbers of individuals in power positions by their ethnicity is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. The numbers of individuals by their ethnicity in the republics' parliaments and governments.

1) North Caucasus	2) total	3) titular	4) Russian	5) 3rd	1) Europe- an part	2)	3)	4)	5)	1) Siberia/ Far East	2)	3)	4)	5)
Adygea 2006/2007	% %	% %	n/a %	- -	Karelia 2011	50 n/a	8 n/a	n/a n/a	- -	Khakassia 2007	% %	% %	% %	- -
Kalmykia 2011	23 20	18 12	4 8	- -	Komi 2007	30 n/a	6 n/a	n/a n/a	- -	Altay 2007	% %	% %	% %	- -
KChR 2009	72 %	37 %	17 %	11 %	Udmurtia 2012	90 %	13 %	67 %	7 -	Buryatia 2007	% %	% %	% %	- -
KBR+ 2009/2012	72 %	39 %	15 %	15 %	Mari El 2009	52 %	15 %	29 %	1 -	Sakha (Y) 2008	% %	% %	% %	- -
N. Ossetia 2009	70 31	61 26	7 4	- -	Mordovia 2007/2009	51 %	11 %	32 %	4 -	Tuva 2006	% %	% %	% %	- -
Dagestan 2010	90 25	27 6	n/a 3	14 4	Bashkorto- stan 2008	% 38	% 21	% 12	% 2					
Chechnya 2011	41 30	n/a n/a	2 1	- -	Chuvashia 2011	47 21	35 19	12 2	- -					
Ingushetia 2011	27 18	n/a n/a	1 0	- -	Tatarstan 2009/2010	98 29	67 27	31 2	- -					

Note: 1) In the first column, the republic's title is given together with the first year of the parliament work and the year for the government. In addition, a separate year for the government is given, if noticeably different. The republics are concentrated in three large geographical areas: the Volga-Ural Region and the European North, the North Caucasus and nearby, and Siberia and the Far East, and are grouped accordingly.

2) The data on the total numbers of regional parliamentarians and government members is presented, accordingly, as the first and second digits in the column for each republic. When only relative data on the corresponding shares of titular and Russian elites is available in sources, the field is marked with '%' and the corresponding data is provided in Table 2.

3) The data on the numbers of parliamentarians and government members of the titular ethnic background.

- 4) The respective data on those of the Russian ethnic background.
 5) The respective data for the third largest group, if applicable.

To what extent is the representation proportional and does any elite group control half or more of the offices? The data on the shares of the largest ethnic groups in power is presented in Table 2 and is counted as a simple average of the shares in two bodies, because the government as a collective body is at least as powerful as the legislature. Many republics have more than two main ethnic groups, sometimes also more than two titular groups. For the purpose of simplicity and availability, the third groups are not in the focus of this study and are discussed only briefly.

Table 2. The shares of the largest ethnic groups in the republics' total population (2010 population census) and the republics' officialdoms.

1) North Caucasus	2)	3)	4)	5)	1) Europe- an part	2)	3)	4)	5)	1) Siberia/ Far East	2)	3)	4)	5)
Adygea <i>+35</i>	25 <i>62</i>	<i>51</i> <i>44</i>	<i>47</i> <i>46</i>	<i>56</i> <i>43</i>	Karelia	7.4 <i>82</i>	n/a	16 <i>n/a</i>	n/a	Khakassia	12 <i>82</i>	<i>10</i> <i>81</i>	<i>15</i> <i>79</i>	<i>6</i> <i>83</i>
Kalmykia <i>+13</i>	57 <i>30</i>	<i>69</i> <i>29</i>	<i>78</i> <i>17</i>	<i>60</i> <i>40</i>	Komi <i>+5</i>	24 <i>65</i>	n/a	20 <i>n/a</i>	n/a	Altay <i>-2</i>	34 <i>57</i>	<i>35</i> <i>53</i>	<i>35</i> <i>56</i>	<i>36</i> <i>50</i>
Karachay- Cherkessia <i>+24</i>	41 <i>32</i> <i>12</i>	<i>50</i> <i>25</i> <i>12</i>	<i>51</i> <i>23</i> <i>15</i>	<i>49</i> <i>27</i> <i>9</i>	Udmurtia <i>+58</i>	28 <i>62</i> <i>7</i>	n/a <i>78</i>	14 <i>74</i> <i>8</i>	n/a	Buryatia <i>-25</i>	30 <i>66</i>	<i>45</i> <i>48</i>	<i>46</i> <i>48</i>	<i>43</i> <i>47</i>
Kabardin- Balkaria <i>+3</i>	57 <i>23</i> <i>13</i>	<i>52</i> <i>20</i> <i>23</i>	<i>54</i> <i>21</i> <i>21</i>	<i>50</i> <i>19</i> <i>25</i>	Mari El <i>+48</i>	44 <i>47</i> <i>6</i>	n/a <i>68</i>	28 <i>56</i> <i>2</i>	n/a	Sakha (Yakutia) <i>+16</i>	50 <i>38</i>	<i>58</i> <i>33</i>	<i>57</i> <i>35</i>	<i>58</i> <i>29</i>
North Ossetia <i>+54</i>	65 <i>21</i>	<i>85</i> <i>11</i>	<i>87</i> <i>10</i>	<i>84</i> <i>13</i>	Mordovia <i>-2</i>	40 <i>53</i> <i>5</i>	n/a <i>52</i>	22 <i>63</i> <i>8</i>	n/a	Tuva	82 <i>16</i>	<i>72</i> <i>23</i>	<i>78</i> <i>19</i>	<i>66</i> <i>28</i>
Dagestan <i>0</i>	29 <i>3.6</i> <i>17</i> <i>15</i> <i>13</i>	<i>27</i> <i>7.3</i> <i>16</i> <i>13</i> <i>12</i>	<i>30</i> <i>2.2</i> <i>16</i> <i>14</i> <i>12</i>	<i>24</i> <i>12</i> <i>16</i> <i>12</i> <i>12</i>	Bashkorto stan <i>+29</i>	30 <i>36</i> <i>25</i>	50 <i>32</i>	45 <i>32</i> <i>27</i>	55 <i>32</i>					
Chechnya	95 <i>1.9</i>	n/a <i>4.3</i>	n/a <i>5.2</i>	n/a <i>3.3</i>	Chuvashia <i>+39</i>	68 <i>27</i>	82 <i>16</i>	74 <i>23</i>	91 <i>9</i>					
Ingushetia	94 <i>0.8</i>	n/a <i>2</i>	n/a <i>4</i>	n/a <i>0</i>	Tatarstan <i>+47</i>	53 <i>40</i>	76 <i>23</i>	66 <i>32</i>	86 <i>14</i>					

Note: 1) In the first column, together with the republic's title, the ratio of over- or underrepresentation is given (%) (see the next sections and Table 3 for the calculation method). 2) The shares of the titular and Russian groups in the total population (%) are presented according to the data of the 2010 population census (also the third largest group, if applicable; presented, accordingly, as the first, second and, possibly, third and fourth digits in the column for each republic). Apparently underrated data of Romanov and Stepanov on the ethnic Russians among the elites in the Volga-Urals republics are given *in italics*. Available less

consistent data on other periods for Adygea, Altay, Khakassia and Mordovia are also given *in italics*.

3) The shares of the titular and Russian elites among the ruling groups (%) are calculated as a simple average of their representation in parliaments and governments.

4) The data on parliamentarians (%) are calculated based on the same sources.

5) The data on government members (%) are calculated based on the same sources.

What does the data mean? The data presents a continuum of cases that, nevertheless, can be clustered in certain patterns. If the share of elite segments among the ruling groups is the function of the share of an ethnic group in the total population, then an ethnic group is either overrepresented and, accordingly, another group is underrepresented, or groups enjoy proportional representation.

1.4 Model for assessment of representation patterns

How can one convert quantitative relations of representation into power relations for the purpose of interpretation of approaches to diversity management? As these are relations, they should be qualified accordingly and not in absolute terms. A scale is needed to measure against. A model is proposed to qualitatively assess the representation patterns according to the shares of elite segments among the ruling group in relation to the size of the groups they are supposed to represent. This study uses an analytical tool that distinguishes the levels of representation along the scale from 'power-sharing', to 'inclusion', 'domination' and 'exclusion'; transitional cases and third-group cases are discussed separately.

1) In a hypothetical situation with two equally sized ethnic groups in a divided society, a 50%-50% paritarian relation among the members of the ruling groups according to their ethnic background would designate a complete proportional representation of their elites and the groups. A 100%-0% relation would designate a complete exclusion of one group and its elite. In a 75%-25% relation, everything above 75% could be conventionally designated as power-sharing and everything below 25% as exclusion. The interval between 75% and 50% could be designated as inclusion and between 50% and 25% as domination. The numbers in the 75%-25% relation were taken solely for the sake of round numbers, because in reality a higher share than 75% may be required for a situation to qualify as power-sharing and a lower share than 25% for exclusion.

2) In reality, the groups are never equal in size, so the standard scheme should be modified to reflect this fact. The modified model differs in comparison with the standard one outlined above in that the calculations are made based on the actual share of the groups. For example, in

a hypothetical situation when the shares of two groups in the total population relates as 60% and 40%, the larger group would be proportionally represented, if its elite has 60% of all seats, share power having 45-70% (taking up to a quarter of the share of the other group or giving it up to a quarter from the own share in comparison to proportional representation), include with more than 70%, dominate with more than 80%, exclude with more than 90%, be included having under 45%, dominated with less than 30%, and excluded with less than 15% of all seats in each case. Similarly, the smaller group would be represented proportionally, if its elite has about 40% of all seats, share the power having 30-55%, include with more than 55%, dominate with more than 70%, exclude with more than 85%, be included having 20-30%, dominated with less than 20%, and excluded with less than 10%.

The modified model should be applied to the interval of the cases ranging from the one when groups are nearly equal in size to one when one group is up to three times larger than the other. The model should not be applied to the situation when one group is more than three times larger, that is, constitutes an absolute majority of more than 75% of the population in a republic and its share in the ruling group is also more than 75%. This situation should be characterized as domination despite possible inclusion of the minority elite.

3) In reality, there are always third groups, which are likely to ally with larger groups. It cannot be predicted in the model with which of the larger groups they would form coalition. Ukrainians and Belarusians are likely to ally with Russian and other minority groups with the titular groups. In the model, it could be assumed that the common influence of the third groups will be zero because they will nullify each other. Hence, in case the third groups are relatively small in size, representation for the two largest groups can be assessed by applying a modified model as if these were the only groups (calculating them together as 100%). In case a third group is nearly equally sized or is otherwise significant in numbers and (or) in status (for example, is a titular or indigenous group), representation can be assessed in the same way as in the standard model, only for three and more groups. The actual impact of the third group(s) should be then assessed qualitatively in case studies of regions.

4) The application of the model produces a hypothetical assessment that should be qualitatively tested and interpreted. Conventionally, the divergence of up to 25% into the share of the other group is interpreted as indicating the mode of power-sharing, up to 50% inclusion and more than 50% that of domination.

1.5 Ethnic representation as an indicator of diversity management

When the model is applied to assess the patterns on representation outlined above, the following matrix on the ratio of over- or underrepresentation of the elites and the corresponding approaches to diversity management in republics appears (see Table 3).

Table 3. Ratio of overrepresentation and the approaches to diversity management.

1) group prevails	2) power-sharing	3) ti-me	4) -25 +25	2) inclusion	3) ti-me	4) +25 +50	2) domination	3) ti-me	4) +50 +75	2) exclusion
titular elites	KChR	1.3	+24	Tatarstan	1.3	+47	Ingushetia	99		
	Sakha (Y)	1.3	+16	Chuvashia	2.5	+39	Chechnya	48		
	Kalmykia	1.92	+13	Adygea	0.4	+35	Tuva	5.1		
	KBR	.51.	+3	Bashkortostan	0.8	+29	North Ossetia	3.1	+54	
	Dagestan	7	0							
Russian elites	Buryatia	2.21	-25				Mari El	1.1	+48	
	Altay	.7	-2				Udmurtia	2.2	+58	
	Mordovia	1.3	-2				Khakassia	6.8		
	Komi	2.7	+5				Karelia	11		

- Note: 1) One elite segment prevailed, and depending on whether this is a titular or Russian segment, the case is placed in the according box.
 2) Republics are placed in boxes depending on their approaches to diversity management assessed based on ethnic representation. Republics are listed in each box in sequence from the highest to the lowest ratio.
 3) The demographic relation of the adjusted sizes between the strongest and second strongest groups in the total population (by times).
 4) The ratio is not marked for the republics that are placed in boxes because of the presence of the absolute majority groups (in five and more times). Other republics are placed in boxes according to the ratio of over- or underrepresentation of their elites (%), except for one republic with the ratio at the margin that is, nonetheless, interpreted as domination (Mari El).

The ratio is calculated as a discrepancy between a would-be proportional representation of the strongest ethnic group in the ruling group according to its share in the total population in the republic and the actual share of the elite segment in the ruling group. The shares are compared not based on raw data but adjusted for the two largest groups as if these were the only groups (also for the significant third and fourth group).

For example, the popular shares of the two largest groups in Adygea of 25% and 62% are adjusted for the two groups as 29% and 71% (counted together not as 87% as in reality, but as 100%); similarly, the elite shares of 51% and 44% are adjusted for the two groups as 54% and 46% (counted together not as 95%, but as 100%). The discrepancy between the shares of the stronger group in the population and in the elite amounts to its over- or underrepresentation

and is recalculated in terms of its infringing on a would-be proportional representation of the other group. The ratio is then the relation that depicts the share that the stronger group has taken due to its overrepresentation (in the example, the proportional share of 29% is overrepresented by +25% with actual share of 54%) from a would-be proportional representation of the other group (+25% of 71% is +35% of 100%).

In case calculations are based on incomplete data on the elite representation (estimations *in italics*), the adjusted share of the elite group is calculated based on adjustment of the largest groups as if they were the only groups in the total population, which impairs accuracy of the assessment. Apparently underrated data on the ethnic Russians among the elites in the Volga-Ural republics were used first for calculation of the possible shares of titular elites also by the postulation that the adjusted common share of titular and Russian elites reflects their adjusted shares as presented for the total population. The ratio for Komi is assessed based on the share of titular elite in regional assembly for a lack of other data. In general, the data for the republics with power-sharing arrangements are more likely available than for those with domination, which could be outcomes of deliberate policies.

2. Representation and diversity management

2.1 Prevalence

In this part, I will look further for regularities in the data on representation along a number of variables from some economic, cultural and identity structures: the correlation in the shares of the titular and Russian ethnic groups, possible presence of a third group or groups, ethnic cleavages, possible ethnic grievances and conflicts, and ethnic and social stratification. In the last section, I will also hypothesize about the impact of political structures.

First of all, there are no paritarian cases, arguably, because these are possible only under formal arrangements. Further, it proved to be practically impossible also under power-sharing to secure an equal and proportional representation of the ethnic groups (Turovsky, 2010: 34-35). Hence, one group always prevailed whatever the approach, as reflected in Table 3. 'Prevalence' of one side is not a separate approach but an overarching feature of all approaches.

An ethnic background of the head of the republic proved to be a good predictor of which ethnic segment of elite has an upper hand in a republic. The institutional design based on super-presidentialism resulted in the prevalence of the strongest group. A super-presidential form of government in Russia proliferated also in the regions (Zamyatin, 2016: 44). The head of

republic is typically the strongest and often the only first-order political actor (Turovsky, 2010: 33). Even if the post of the speaker of regional legislature or of the head of government typically receives a representative of the second strongest group, these positions are much weaker than that of the head of republic, and the elites often express their dissatisfaction with a lesser post.

In the post-Soviet period, the tendency was the substitution of the heads of republics of the titular nationality with those of Russian origin. Up to the mid-1990s, the heads of all republics were of the titular nationality except three (Buryatia, Komi and Mordovia). In the following years, the heads of republics continue to be of the titular nationality in the republics with the leading role of titular elites. Similarly, the heads are of the non-titular nationality in the republics with the leading role of the Russian elite and the Russian majority. By summer 2015, the heads of Mari El, Mordovia, Altay and Khakassia were ethnic Russians, the head of Buryatia was an ethnic Udmurt, the heads of Komi and Udmurtia were of a mixed origin, and the head of Karelia was of an Ingrian Finnish origin.

The correlation of the ethnicity of a head of republic with the prevalence of the corresponding elite segment is an interesting empirical finding that contributes to the argument about the relevance of ethnicity. Of course, there are too many variables behind appointing an individual to this position, and no unidimensional relation can be established.

As the cleavage structure theory predicts, complementary ethno-religious cleavages correlated with the patterns of prevalence of one group over the other(s) in the republics. The religious cleavage was present in case of the republics with Muslim titular groups. The most contrasting example is the Volga-Ural republics, among which three were in control of their Muslim titular groups and in three Finno-Ugric republics power was controlled by the regional Russian elites.

Geographical location of the republics partly corresponds with the prevalence of the titular or Russian elites and reinforces the pattern of ethno-religious cleavages with the concentration of diversity in certain areas. The Russian elites dominate in the Finno-Ugric republics of the Volga-Ural Region and the European North, titular elites dominated in most republics of the North Caucasus, the regional Russian elites were included in the ruling groups of the Turkic republics of the Volga-Ural Region, while the republic of Siberia and the Far East have a mixed record.

Types of ethnic and social stratification are measured on the scale between segmentation and social cohesion along such parameters as the correlation between social status, ethnicity,

faith, language and inter-ethnic marriage. Socio-economic inequalities reinforce ethnic cleavages. Among the parameters, I took the level of urbanization as an indicator of ethnic and social stratification. Overlapping ethnic differentiation and social stratification between urban and rural dwellers was characteristic of the republics with titular groups concentrated in rural areas, as in the Finno-Ugric republics. Cross-cutting social and ethnic cleavages were in place in the republics with significant presence of titular groups also in urban areas, in particular, in the capital city, as in the Volga Turkic republics. The prevalence of elites correlated with the level of urbanization of respective groups.

The titular elites kept the leading role among the elites in the Muslim republics even being in the numerical minority. Indicating the significance of religion, McGarry notes that ethno-religious minorities are less likely to be the object of an assimilationist policy than ethnolinguistic minorities (McGarry, 2010: 39-40). However, Russia's regular ('non-ethnic') regions subjected to assimilationist policies all groups. For example, Golosov has demonstrated that in such regions the Muslim minority groups were typically side-lined from regional power coalitions (Golosov, 2012).

2.2 Domination

The ethnic composition of population influenced in such a way that the elite of the group in the numerical majority was likely to dictate the rules of consolidation. At the same time, even if the elite of the largest group tended to be overrepresented among the ruling groups in most republics, the regimes ended up having different approaches.

The republics with populations that had one ethnic group in the firm numerical majority tended to produce an ethnic domination. John McGarry defines domination as 'a hierarchy of privilege in a political system, where one group can exert power over another, stamping its culture and authority on the collective life of the state' (McGarry, 2010: 36). Depending on whether the goal of domination is the preservation of ethnic divisions or their elimination, either the strategies of control or assimilation are pursued.

It is meaningful to distinguish between absolute domination and domination relative to other groups. Exclusion has not been found even in the five republics where the share of the largest groups and their elites is more than 75%. The titular elites in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Tuva, but also the Russian elites in Khakassia and Karelia (and the autonomous districts), are dominant already due to the fact that the titular groups make up an absolute majority of more

than 82% in the total populations. Despite this, the other groups are typically included and ethnic Russians also significantly overrepresented mainly at the expense of other minority groups.

For example, the Russian elites enjoyed a much higher rate of representation due to positive discrimination in Chechnya and Ingushetia with their nearly monoethnic populations. Ingushetia introduced an official quota for three ethnic Russian deputies in the regional assembly, although in reality there is only one (Kosikov, 2012: 175-176, 282). The willingness of authorities to promote ethnic Russians might be attributed, among other things, to the marginal character of such representation that does not challenge in any way the domination of the titular nations and rather serves symbolic purposes and prevents accusations of discrimination. Ethnic Russians in Tuva are included in the ruling group by the number that is higher by half than their population share, perhaps not least due to their higher education rates. This gives ground to assess the case as staying at the margin with inclusion. Nevertheless, ethnic Tuvians still make up three fourths of the ruling group and clearly dominate in the republic. The opposite is true for Karelia and Khakassia, where the shares of titular parliamentarians in regional assemblies are higher than in the population, but still marginal. The case of Crimea annexed in 2014 is not discussed in this paper, but it would also fall into this category, with the difference that far less Crimean Tatars seem to be represented in the ruling group than their share in the population of 12%.

It is the domination in relation to other groups that usually draws attention due to significant overrepresentation of one group. In three other cases of domination, by the titular elite in North Ossetia as well as by the regional Russian elites in Udmurtia and Mari El, the relation of sizes of the largest groups varies from more than three times in North Ossetia, more than two times in Udmurtia and to a minimal difference in Mari El. Neither has significant third groups nor significant religious divides. In fact, common religion enhances social cohesion not only drawing together Ossetians and Russians, who are Orthodox groups among many Muslim groups of the North Caucasus, but also contributes to the domination of the Ossetians in the republic. A cross-cutting social cleavage that contributes to overrepresentation of Ossetians is their high level of urbanization. Ossetians outnumber Russians three to one in the republic, which is close to absolute domination, and the shares of the groups among inhabitants of the capital city roughly reflects their shares in the population.

There is no disaggregated data across the whole matrix of the republics separately on the legislature and the administration. However, some conclusions could be made on the basis of

the available data for some republics. An analysis of representation across the authority branches provides a key for understanding why Udmurtia and Mari El ended up in domination, how its mechanisms differ and whether any regularities can be noticed. If in the early 1990s the share of deputies of the titular nationality was nearly proportional or sometimes overrepresented, then by the early 2000s it has dramatically decreased to a level significantly below proportional. The parliamentary representation became somewhat more balanced after 2010, apparently as an indirect effect of the state-wide centralization policy.

In the republics where the level of ethnic mobilization in the early 1990s was rather low titular elites were often forced to seek a compromise with the Russian elites (for details, see Zamyatin, 2015: 383-384). As a result of consensual culture, the share of titular elites among government officials has decreased somewhat less from its peak at the time of sovereignization. For example, despite the domination of the Russian elite, the regime in Udmurtia continues to practise co-optation of titular elite, which is a feature of inclusion. Having low chances of becoming a significant political force itself, the titular elite chose the strategy of co-operation with different other elite segments. Accordingly, whatever political actor dominates, the titular elite retains access to some minister portfolios. The higher representation in administration than in parliament is also less discernible due to the group's lower share in this republic in comparison with the two others.

A situation of nearly equally sized groups produced a conflict in Mari El because of the opposite dynamics. The titular elite perceived itself sufficiently strong to present as a separate political source and entered into a confrontation for power. A long period during the 1990s of power-sharing ended after their loss in 2000. Since the 2000s, a drastic decrease in the share of the titular elite turned into the domination of the Russian elite. The titular representation in parliament dropped from about a half in 1995 down to 28% in 2009-2014 and further to about 21% since, or twice less than the group's popular share. Most outstandingly, only one to three ministers of the titular nationality used to be in government. Thus, one element of domination is symbolic inclusion as co-optation for the purpose of control of collaborating segments of ethnic elites (Zamyatin, 2015: 383-384).

The domination is concentrated in executive authorities. This executive underrepresentation is often not immediately evident due to a counterbalancing weight of the share of municipal elites in the aggregated data. In the republics with the titular minority conjoined with vertical ethnic stratification, the share of titular elites among municipal elites is usually higher than among the ruling groups in general, which the available data witnesses, for

example, for Mari El (Zamyatin, 2015: 360-362) and can be attributed to their majority in rural areas. However, as noted above, municipalities are built in the ‘vertical of power’ and municipal overrepresentation does not compensate for executive underrepresentation.

One possible explanation for the different patterns of parliamentary and administrative representation might lie in the fashion of their formation. Significant efforts and resources that are accessible primarily to the dominant groups were needed to ensure public support for candidates to regional assemblies. At the same time, ethnic pressure groups were able to negotiate and bargain among other segments of the regional elites that translated into governmental posts also for non-dominant groups.

While the analysis of representation across power branches provided some insight on the patterns of overrepresentation amounting to domination, the diversity of these cases means that neither the relation of sizes nor presence of third groups played a decisive role in republics. The relation of sizes might still have played its role in that the overrepresentation of the dominant group is more extended in the situation when comparable shares of the groups tend to increase grievances among their elites, as in Mari El. Further, overlapping ethnic differentiation and social inequality resulted in the Russian regional domination in Udmurtia and Mari El. Representation in executive authorities that are directly controlled by the head of republic is more flexible and, thus, illustrious of the regime. Furthermore, disproportion tends to multiply at the lower stories of the government due to the practice that new ministers tend to come with their team based, *inter alia*, on ethnic networks which is one of the principles for forming clienteles.

2.3 Inclusion

While the absence of the republics practising exclusion was a rather expected outcome, a relatively small number of republics with inclusion is an outcome that deserves attention. This should not be the result of a random scale of intervals in the model: if we shift the agreed margin between the modes of power-sharing and inclusion from 25% to 20%, the redistribution of republics in boxes will requalify only two cases, Karachay-Cherkessia and Buryatia. A shift of the margin between inclusion and domination from 50% to 55% will again requalify only two cases, North Ossetia and Mari El.

The distinction between descriptive and substantial representation is helpful for analysis of the ‘weak’ forms of inclusion on its margin with regional Russian domination. As the core

of the linguistic and cultural demands of titular elites is support for their language and culture, minority elites are usually given portfolios of the ministers of culture and education, which resembles 'cultural self-government' as an element of power-sharing (O'Leary, 2008: 54-55). Thus, one indicator of substantial representation is the institutionalization in law of some additional modes of language teaching in the school curriculum, such as compulsory study of titular language for all students, as in Komi, or native language of instruction, as in Mordovia, which are not enforced, for example, in Udmurtia or Mari El. This indicator is not relevant for the regional Russian populations in the numerical minority because the educational framework is the same for the whole country and, at least in theory, they are provided with full access to public services in Russian.

On the margin with titular domination are the cases of Chuvashia and Tatarstan. The titular group is larger by more than in two times in Chuvashia and by less than one third in Tatarstan. In Chuvashia, the titular group and Russians are Orthodox. In 1998, 67% of parliamentarians were Chuvash, 23% were Russians and 7% were Tatars (Shabunin, 2003). In 2011, 74% parliamentarians were Chuvashes, 23% were Russians and 2% were Tatars; in 2015, 19 members of government were Chuvash and two were ethnic Russians (my calculation).

A decades-long relative domination of the titular group in Tatarstan should be attributed to a legacy of sovereignization that produced an exceptional political status of Tatarstan and special relations with the centre. Further, the co-existence of Islam and Orthodoxy reinforces the religious cleavage between the Tatars and the Russians. In 1999, 75% of the parliamentarians were ethnic Tatars down to 66% ten years later (Drobizheva, 2003; Tishkov and Stepanov 2013b). Salagaev and Sergeev (2013) reported that still in 2010-2012 there were only two ethnic Russians among twenty-nine government members. However, in the following years the number of ethnic Russian government members in the republic doubled (after the 2015 elections, it increased to seven). Therefore, since the change in leadership in 2010, the representation of ethnic Russians in Tatarstan increased both in the parliament and the government, although it is still below the proportional level. Their noticeable under-representation qualifies the case of Tatarstan as that of inclusion.

To be sure, the ethnic composition with the majority of a group in the total population does not always determine also the prevalence of its elite. Adygea and Bashkortostan, which qualify as cases of inclusion, are the republics where the titular elites preserved the leading role in the ruling group coupled with the Russian plurality in the population. These republics were among those that established titular domination due to a high level of popular ethnic

mobilization. The overrepresentation was somewhat ambiguously called ‘ethnization’ of the political elites (Galliamov, 2006), as if the dominating elites, be it by titular or Russian elites, were not ‘ethnicized’ by default.

In Bashkortostan, the titular group comprised less than a third of the total population, but for a long time dominated in the ruling group. In 1999 about 49% of parliamentarians (43.7% in the lower chamber and 55% in the upper chamber) and 60% of government members were of the titular nationality, while, accordingly, 23% and 14% were ethnic Russians (Galliamov, 2006). Since 2008, the number of the titular parliamentarians decreased to 45%, while the number of Russians increased to 32% and Tatars to 27% (Tishkov and Stepanov, 2013b: 40). In 2015, according to my analysis, among thirty-eight government members, twenty-one were Bashkirs and twelve were Russians. By nearly proportional ethnic Russian representation, the titular elite was still overrepresented at the expense of the Tatars and other groups. Thus, Bashkortostan’s elite structure is characterized by inclusion of the ethnic Russians and domination over the Tatar-speaking community. Thus, approaches towards different groups could vary within the same republic, whereas the third non-titular groups were often under domination.

How was ethnic domination still possible, if the group in the numerical majority could just outvote the dominant group? Grigorii Golosov’s observation about the case of Adygea is interesting for revealing the role of party politics as an electoral mechanism of domination. According to him, titular elites were overrepresented in the party lists not only of *United Russia* but also of the other parties, for example, in the 2006 elections (Golosov, 2012: 101, 104). Minority candidates were typically included both in party electoral lists and in rural minority-majority single-mandate districts (Zamyatin, 2015).

Golosov attributes such tactics of the inclusion of candidates of different ethnic identities to the strategy of non-politicization of ethnic cleavages, when the dominant elite prevents raising ethnic issues on the political agenda. The opposite strategy of politicization of ethnic cleavages could also be observed, even if usually ineffective. ‘Congresses of the (titular) peoples’, ethnic Russian nationalist organizations and other organizations of non-dominant elites sought to raise ethnic issues. For example, the Union of Slavs of Adygea entered into conflict with the republic’s authorities (Golosov, 2012: 101). The strategy of politicization of ethnicity and accompanying conflicts were also typical in the case of third titular groups, such as Circassians, Balkars, Tatars in Bashkortostan or, among less known cases, Erzya in Mordovia.

Proportional systems are said to ensure some representation of dispersed minority groups, but these are single-mandate districts that favour better representation of territorially concentrated minorities, especially those in ethnic regions (Moser, 2013). Contrary to this logic, proportional representation under the conditions of ‘electoral authoritarianism’ ensured a higher level of titular representation, because it was easier in a centralized manner to include titular candidates in party lists.

Therefore, when the titular elite was sufficiently consolidated to exclude other centres of influence by controlling political institutions and the major parties, it for a long period succeeded in keeping the domination. In this context, inclusion in the republics discussed in this section was not so much a strategic choice as an inability to maintain domination in the conflictual situation due to the demographic factor under intensified pressure from the centre since the early 2010s.

2.4 Power-sharing

Alternatively, especially in the situation when ethnic groups were more or less equal in size, practices amounted to regional power-sharing (Zamyatin, 2015). According to Lijphart, power-sharing is possible when all major segments of society enjoy a proportional level of representation or at least a share of power. Lijphart lists some conditions for stability of the political regime based on power-sharing. In order for power-sharing to last, communities should enjoy segmental autonomy and their elites should realize the necessity of cooperation. At the same time, if there are only two major segments in a society, a dual balance of power is unstable, because it carries a danger of political polarization and inhibits cooperation of elites and their participation in a grand coalition (Lijphart, 1977: 55-61).

Lijphart distinguished mass and elite political cultures. Elite political cultures are coalitional or contradictory. It is the ability of political elites to co-operate and make coalitions that is crucial for the success of power-sharing. Grigorii Golosov finds Lijphart’s distinction between coalitional or contradictory political cultures still useful for studying minority representation in the Russian regions. He found that, even after the regions established an authoritarian rule, their ethnic policies can be still either inclusive or exclusive (Golosov, 2014). The findings of this study support and provide new evidence for Golosov’s conclusion.

Indeed, the data demonstrate that the presence of a sizable third group, which comprised a second titular group larger than 10%, or several groups, had a facilitating effect for power-

sharing solutions. Among the republics with a significant third group, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardin-Balkaria have two titular groups. In Karachay-Cherkessia, following the informal practice, a Karachay holds the presidential post, a Circassian the post of the government head and ethnic Russians those of the vice-president and the chairman of legislature. The same practice was followed in Kabardin-Balkaria and Dagestan (Tishkov and Stepanov, 2013a: 45, 53, 90-91). Dagestan is exceptional for its tradition of power shared among the ‘peoples of the republic’, which means the nearly proportional level of representation of the four largest groups, Avar, Dargin, Kumyk and Lezgin. The numerous demographically smaller groups tend to be somewhat underrepresented, while smaller groups are much less represented.

Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardin-Balkaria make the core of the group of republics with power-sharing. A common feature of the political situation in these republics that contributes to the drive for power-sharing along ethnic lines is the presence of ethnic conflicts, that is, of those conflicts that have not taken shape of institutional or intra-elite confrontation and where conflict sides are categorized in terms of ethnic groups.

In addition, the data on representation in Sakha (Yakutia) also matches the indicators of power-sharing, but in this republic the situation evolved from that of titular domination. The share of the Yakuts dropped from its peak of 73.1% in parliament and 70% in government in the late 1990s to, accordingly, 57.4% and 58.3% (Drobizheva, 2003; Ochirova, 2011: 141). Nowadays the Yakuts compose more than half of the republic’s population due to outflow of non-titular groups from the North. There is no single significant third group, but there are several small numbered indigenous peoples that are politically underrepresented.

Mari El and Mordovia also have split titular groups, but the cleavages are not that deep. The leadership co-opts less powerful groups. Lijphart’s scheme helps to explain why power-sharing proved unstable in such cases, as Mari El, where more or less equally sized groups entered a competition race and neither the small Hill Mari nor Tatar community provided a stabilizing effect. It seems the presence of non-titular groups under 10%, as the Tatar communities in the neighbouring Finno-Ugric republics, had no noticeable impact. At the same time, underrepresentation of the Tatar community with the magnitude of 25% in Bashkortostan provoked a conflict. Sometimes the third group sided with the titular and sometimes with the Russian counterparts.

In some cases of power-sharing, in Altay, Mordovia, Komi, titular elites were only ‘minority shareholders’, which places these republics on the margin with inclusion. In these

republics, titular representation in regional assemblies, even if sometimes nearly proportional, was low due to the demographic distribution of groups. Titular elites were, nevertheless, included among the ruling group in the executive branch of power. The terms of this executive power-sharing with regard to its ethnic aspects depended on many factors. Success of titular elites depended on their ability to co-operate with other segments of elites. Most of their demands for the establishment of ethnic institutions were not included in the elite pact. The Russian elites were unwilling to grant ethnic institutions, which could be used instrumentally by titular elites to take hold of power and engage in further ethnic mobilization. However, the Russian elites had to make in the process of regime consolidation at least some concessions to titular elites. These were framed not as institutions but as practices often connected to symbolic recognition.

Finally, Kalmykia and Buryatia are the republics with the Buddhist titular groups. The titular group in Kalmykia is in the majority, outnumbering ethnic Russians in the republic by almost two times and making a proportional share among urban dwellers in the capital city. The case of Buryatia is at the margin of power-sharing, where the titular group was significantly overrepresented. Titular elite used to have the leading role in the republic, although its overrepresentation rather reflected a higher share of Buryats among municipal elites. In absolute terms, the two largest groups are represented nearly equally in parliament. However, in 2007 the Kremlin directly interfered and insisted on the appointment of an ‘outsider’, an ethnic Udmurt, to the post of the head of the republic, which was previously occupied by an ethnic Buryat. The appointee included many ethnic Russians in the government, which shifted the balance towards prevalence of the regional Russian elite.

2.5 Political regime types

Variation in economic, cultural and identity structures to some extent explains the representation patterns, but these are mediated through political structures. In this section, I will invoke another set of variables revealing the impact of regional political regimes, which Rostislav Turovsky defined as ‘interrelated constellations of political actors and institutions existing in a specific territory’. He suggested focusing in exploration of regional political regimes on the dichotomies of ‘autonomy-dependence’, ‘democracy-authoritarianism’, ‘monocentric-polycentric’ and ‘consolidation-competition’ (Turovsky, 2010: 19-20). I will

pinpoint the correlation of these parameters with the patterns of ethnic representation, leaving testing these conjectures for a further study.

A higher level of autonomy from the centre does not correlate with ethnic representation, because the latter was an outcome of regional developments and not of centre-periphery relations. The re-establishment of the 'power vertical' resulted in significant undermining of self-governance of all republics. Nevertheless, some politically or economically strong republics, for example Tatarstan and Chechnya, continue to enjoy *de facto* a stronger standing vis-a-vis the Kremlin that was expressing itself, inter alia, in continued practices of clientelism. Since 2010, the Kremlin's interference in some republics directed at increase of their dependence sometimes also signified the end of titular domination.

Scholars sometimes argued that ethnic republics with the dominant titular elites are usually more authoritarian than 'non-ethnic' regions (Turovsky, 2010: 22). However, the studies that take the number of effectively represented political parties as an indicator, by the absence of ethnic parties and dispersion of ethnic candidates among the parties, cannot stand for the interplay between ethnicity and democracy. Results of complex studies that take into account several indicators do not provide evidence for any significant correlation between the regional democracy rating and ethnic representation (Petrov and Titkov, 2013).

Monocentrist or polycentrist regimes are defined by the separation of powers between branches of authorities. While the principle of power separation was undermined in all regions, its extent varied. In a monocentric regime, the dominant actor typically presides over a hierarchical structure. The hierarchy did not correlate with the patterns of ethnic representation in legislative and executive authorities as well as municipalities across the republics.

The institutionalized conflicts between the ruling group and opposition, or between branches of power are more visible to the public than intra-elite conflicts. Yet, it is competition between the elite segments that characterizes the actual decision-making process. The number of the centres of political influence determined the level of political competition. The scenarios of the regime consolidation depended on consensual and conflictual regime types (Golosov, 2014), whether the dominant actor tolerated existence of other power centres or attempted to eradicate them. Imposing consolidation, the dominant actor typically took into account the ethnic dimension and provided non-dominant elites with a share of the republican pie. Those ruling groups, who achieved domination through the conflict, had no incentive in sharing power

with the defeated elite segments. Regional power-sharing and ethnic domination as the political outcomes seem to have correlated with consensual and conflictual types of regimes.

Conclusion

Some scholars have pointed out the unexpectedly underwhelming role of ethnicity in post-Soviet Russian politics (Gorenburg and Giuliano, 2012). The findings of this study point at ethnic representation as a relevant practice for the formation of the republics' officialdoms under the authoritarian regime, which is hard to detect from the institutionalist approach. The regional arrangements remain the key solutions to the challenge of diversity also after the demise of federalism.

What were the patterns of representation? In the early 1990s, the Soviet legacy of ethnically balanced appointments sustained a degree of power-sharing (Zamyatin, 2015: 355-357). Russia ended up in an institutional design that established super-presidentialism. Notably, it seems to be an outcome of the similar institutional design in regions that the ethnic background of the head of the republic always correlated with prevalence. The institutional design determined scenarios of regime consolidation under authoritarian tendencies. With the stabilization of political institutions in the mid-1990s, the dominant elite segment in the republics with one group larger than other(s), titular or Russian, tended to become overrepresented among the ruling group. The regime consolidation often signified the domination and marginalization of counter-elites or at least a common prevalence of one ethnic group in the republic's leadership.

Alternatively, especially if ethnic groups were more or less equal in size and power, it was impossible to win with the help of ethnic mobilization of one group. In that case, imposed consolidation typically included co-optation of counter-elite. As a compromise, the major groups were likely to be provided a share of power or, at least, included in power coalitions. Therefore, it is remarkable that the consensual or conflictual regime types seem to have relied on the approaches either of domination of the titular or Russian elites or of power-sharing between larger ethnic segments of regional elites in most republics. The establishment of regional varieties of an authoritarian regime have not principally brought change in the two scenarios.

Why might these patterns have emerged? In line with the institutionalist account, the elites were largely restricted by structural factors such as the ethnic structure of the republics.

While demography on its own was not a good predictor, it had significance in correlation with other variables. Absolute domination became a default setting due to demographic factors. Relative domination of titular groups was established in the conditions of their numerical majority in the population in correlation with their proportional or higher share among the urban dwellers. At that, the presence of the religious cleavage in the republics titled after the Muslim groups typically signified deeper ethnic divides and a lower level of intercommunal trust and inspired the ‘winner-takes-all’ strategy. Titular domination over the republic’s leadership, with some exceptions, was maintained well into the 2010s. Regional Russian domination in relation to titular groups was sustained under the cross-cutting ethnic-religious and social cleavages in the case of significant Russian majority among urban dwellers. The presence of a third group and ethnic conflict situations involving more than two titular groups contributed to power-sharing especially in the three most diverse republics of the North Caucasus.

With the curtailment of regional self-governance, it became more difficult to sustain regional power-sharing, because the conditions for consensual decision-making were undermined. Some republics drifted through conflict in the direction of domination usually of the regional Russian elites as, for example, in Mari El. So far, the Kremlin supported regional Russian domination in some republics and tolerated power-sharing arrangements in some other republics, expecting the regional elites to deliver votes and provide for political stability. At the same time, the change of republic’s chief officials under the Kremlin’s pressure invoked the shift from titular domination to inclusion of the regional Russian elites in a few cases, notably in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. In general, the mixed approach to diversity management within the formally retained federal framework provided flexible tools that the leadership employed depending on the situation in republics.

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Commentary: The Roots of Catalan Identity and Ethno-Nationalism

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For decades, ample attention has been devoted by international social scientists and humanists to documenting and analyzing Catalan ethno-nationalism. Yet relatively few of these scholarly sources have delved into the long history of Catalonia. Indeed, an appreciation of the complex history of Catalonia is vital in understanding how deep-rooted have been the Catalan search for identity, the uniqueness of Catalan language and culture, and the development of Catalan politicization. One particularly useful, recently re-published and updated source is *The History of Catalonia*, written by F. Xavier Hernandez, Professor of Didactic Social Sciences at the University of Barcelona. The first edition in English was initially published in 2007, with a second edition published in 2014, available (in English as well as other languages) from the Museu d'Historia de Catalunya in Barcelona.

There are seven (unnumbered) chapters in this concise yet detailed book. The first chapter, titled 'Prehistory and Old World', takes us a very long way back into the history of the region which eventually became Catalonia – in fact, an astonishing 450,000 years into the first evidence of pre-Neanderthal remains and Palaeolithic tools. Accompanying maps indicate the locations of

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Palaeolithic (800,000-10,000 BP), Epipalaeolithic (8,000-6,000 BP), and Neolithic (6,000-2,000 BP) settlements, as well as rock art locations, graves and menhir monuments during the Megalithic Age (3,500-1,200 BC), and settlements and mining sites during the Calcolithic and Bronze Ages (2,000-800 BC). The chapter goes on to describe the arrival of Greeks and Phoenicians, then the development of Iberian settlements, followed by extensive Roman development along the coast. Eventually, Romans introduced Christianity, which spread during the third and fourth centuries.

The second chapter, on Proto-Catalonia, essentially covers the long period of Arab/Berber influence within the Emirate of Cordoba, beginning with the disintegration of Visigothic kingdoms, countered by the Hispanic March within the Frankish Carolingian Empire, which consisted of eight Catalan counties by the tenth century, yet Tarragona and Lleida remained under Islamic control through the early twelfth century.

The first explicit reference to the designation ‘Catalonia’ appeared in a chronicle dating 1114-15. The third chapter describes Catalonia during the feudal era, at which time much of the region became consolidated into the extended territory under the Count of Barcelona, with the addition of what was known as ‘New Catalonia’ during the eleventh to twelfth centuries. Longstanding French influence continued with the Occitanian expansion toward the end of the twelfth century; yet this was followed, in turn, by the eastward expansion of Aragon into Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands during the thirteenth century, and farther to Sardinia by 1327 (where the port of Alghero retains a Catalan identity to the present day). This was a time of urban development, together with economic and demographic growth, particularly centred on Barcelona. Most of the increasingly cosmopolitan Catalan cities and larger towns included settlements of hitherto marginalized Aljama Moors and Jews. Science, thought and culture flourished, however a widespread plague in 1348, followed by repeated earthquakes, took their toll. A ten-year civil war in 1462-72 led to French intervention and the occupation, then annexation of Catalunya Nord in 1462-64.

The fourth chapter, titled ‘On the Edge of the Empire’, describes the increasing ‘assimilation’ of the Catalan nobility into the Spanish nobility through an explicit policy of intermarriage. Catalan society fell under ‘the severe control of a restrictive establishment’ (65), while suffering from frequent violence, banditry and on the coast Turkish and Berber piracy. In 1610, over four thousand Moriscos (Spanish Muslims baptized – often forcibly – as Christians)

were expelled from Catalonia, while an intransigent Catholic counter-reformation dominated the church. Catalan politics were becoming characteristically complicated. Again, French interference was evident in what was called *la Guerra dels Segadors* (the Reapers' War) in 1640-59, resulting in a Spanish counteroffensive, followed by Bourbon occupation during the Succession War (1705-14).

Professor Hernandez reveals his particular interest in economic history in first describing, in this chapter, agriculture, manufacturing and trade during the eighteenth century, then continuing in the next chapter with his description of steam industrialization and the textile industry during the mid-nineteenth century, and building of the railway network, population growth and urbanization during the late nineteenth century: 'From 1840, Catalonia was involved in an irreversible process which was to forge a totally industrialized and modern society' (98); however, this time was also increasingly characterized by a struggle between the industrial bourgeoisie and proletariat. 'The nineteenth century was a period of wars, revolutions and revolts which were an expression of the contradictions of a society undergoing wholesale transformation' (85). Yet again, France (at war with Spain in 1793-95), having annexed Roussillon (Catalunya Nord), occupied Cerdagne (Cerdanya), Val d'Aran, and much of Catalonia in 1808-13 during the Peninsular War. This turmoil was followed by the Carlist Wars in 1833-40. A distinct Catalan cultural movement, the *Renaixença*, was born, evidenced not only in a resurgence of Catalan culture and language but also the unique Modernist art and architecture of Gaudi; indeed, the resurgence and politicization of Catalan language and culture have continued to the present day.¹ 'During the nineteenth century Catalonia established itself as an industrial country. This set Catalonia further apart from the other regions of Spain, as it was now economically, socially, and culturally different. A growing contrast existed between industrialized Catalonia and Spain, which was still basically agricultural' (103). The first Catalanist Congress was organized in 1880, and the *Centre Catalana* founded two years later, during a wave of terrorism. The basis of Catalan nationalism was the *Unio Catalanista* (1891-1904).

The author's preoccupation with economic development and technological change continues into the next chapter, titled 'The Electric Years'; yet this chapter covers a time of more than just electricity and industrial diversification – it was a time of growing Catalan nationalism and indeed an 'electric' political atmosphere. Apart from continuing to describe economic and cultural development, attention is directed to the increasingly complicated 'political Catalanism'

represented in the formation of the Lliga Regionalista in 1901, the Solidaritat Catalana nationalist coalition in 1906 (victorious in the regional election the next year), and the Mancomunitat de Catalunya in 1914 (a prelude to recognition of Catalan autonomy by the Spanish central government). In 1905 soldiers had attacked the offices of Catalan journalists and newspapers, including *La Veu de Catalunya* (The Voice of Catalonia). Following the entry of the Lliga into the Spanish government and organization of a revolutionary general strike in 1917, a campaign was organized for self-government for Catalonia.

The seventh and final chapter covers – in particular – the political turmoil from the 1930s Franco era through to recent years. In 1931 a Catalan Republic was unilaterally proclaimed, and a Statute of Self-government (Estatut d'Autonomia) voted on by the Catalan electorate and passed the next year. Lluís Companys, the President of the Generalitat (the Catalan parliament), declared a Catalan state, but within the Spanish Federal Republic. This resulted in the imprisonment of the Catalan government and 'indefinite' suspension of the Statute in 1938, only to have Catalan nationalists re-establish self-government and the Generalitat the following year. The Spanish Civil War hit Catalonia hard; with intense fighting on the Aragon front, Franco again abolished self-government in 1938 and Companys was executed in 1940. Catalan resistance grew; a new Catalan government in exile came into being at the end of the war. Later, during the 1960s, a campaign commenced for Catalanization of the Catholic hierarchy, and the Coordinating Committee of Political Forces in Catalonia was founded. The following decade, the Assembly of Catalonia was founded in 1971; with the death of Franco in 1975, the Spanish monarchy was restored; the Catalan Socialist Party was founded; over a million Catalans took part in a mass demonstration (the first of many to come) in September 1977. Following the 'provisional' re-establishment of the Generalitat, most significantly, in 1978 Catalonia was recognized as an Autonomous Community with the status of a Historical Region within Spain, according to the Statute of Autonomy, giving the Generalitat the powers enabling it to carry out the functions of self-government. But Catalonia was just one of seventeen autonomous regions (together comprising virtually all of Spain). Catalan autonomists – together with Basques and Galicians – have long argued that their regions, having distinct languages and cultures, should have far more rights than other regions.² In 1980 the first elections to the restored Catalan parliament took place, and nationalist Jordi Pujol was elected President.³ A revised Statute was approved in 2006, however an attempt to change the Spanish Constitution failed in 2010; this resulted again in a mass demonstration under the slogan: 'We are

a nation – We decide’ (i.e. not the central Spanish government). In 2011 a referendum held in Barcelona called for the complete independence of Catalonia from Spain, and the following year another mass demonstration of more than a million flooded the streets with the slogan ‘Catalonia – a new European state’. Then a social movement, La Via Catalana (the Catalan Way) linked an estimated 1.7 million people in a huge human chain stretching over 400 km across Catalonia, calling for independence.

To bring us up to date, some very important developments in Catalan nationalism and separatism have occurred during the past three years since the publication of this book in October 2014. The 2015 election was significant: out of 135 seats in the Catalan parliament, 68 would be needed for a clear majority – however no one political party was able to gain a majority. There are many political parties and shifting alliances in Catalonia, ranging from left to right in their political philosophy; more importantly, some parties have advocated complete independence of Catalonia from Spain, others continuing status-quo union with Spain, while between these polarities still others have supported increased autonomy for Catalonia but short of complete independence. Of two leading separatist parties, *Junta pel si* (Together for yes) won 62 seats and the newly-formed CUP – *Candidatura d’Unitat Popular* (Popular Unity Candidacy) won 10 – thus separatists together now held 72 seats, sufficient to form government – if they could only agree. Among the unionist parties, the *Partit de la Ciutadania* (Party of the Citizenship) won 25 seats, the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (Socialist Party of Catalonia) 16, and the *Partit Popular Catala* (Catalan People’s Party) 11 – so unionists now held 52 seats. The remaining 11 seats were won by nationalists favouring self-determination but not necessarily independence: *Catalunya si que es pot* (Catalonia yes we can), a new coalition with *Podemos*, and *Unio Democratica de Catalunya* (Democratic Union of Catalonia). A strategic alliance between the two leading pro-independence parties was established January 9, 2016, giving them the needed majority to form the government – which could be further strengthened with the added support of lesser independence parties such as *Solidaritat Catalana per la Independencia* (Catalan Solidarity for Independence).

So the drive for independence soon came to a head. On September 6, 2017 the Catalan government called for a referendum on independence to be held October 1. Immediately the central government of Spain stressed that such a vote would be illegal and unconstitutional, so would be blocked. Yet 700 mayors vowed to open polling stations, and two mass pro-independence demonstrations were held in Barcelona. Despite efforts of the *Guardia Civil* to forcefully disrupt

the voting (more than 800 were injured), arrest compliant mayors, and neutralize the regional police (Los Mosses d'Esquadia), 73% of voting stations remained open or were re-opened. Out of a registered electorate numbering 5.3 million, just 2.3 million voted, and of these a claimed 90% voted for independence (the referendum was widely boycotted by anti-independence protesters, in addition to people who feared going out to vote). The Catalonia President Carles Puigdemont claimed that the referendum was a clear indication of support for independence. Within days, the fallout was inevitable: the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy declared the referendum illegal; the Spanish King Felipe VI condemned the Catalan leaders; and the Spanish constitutional court ordered suspension of the Catalonia parliament. Mass demonstrations by independence supporters were countered by an equally mass demonstration by unionists. Finally, after pleading unsuccessfully for dialogue, Puigdemont signed a declaration of independence on October 10, whereupon Rajoy gave the Catalan government an eight-day ultimatum (later extended three days) before Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution would be invoked to dissolve the Catalan government and cancel autonomy. Then on October 19 the Spanish government imposed direct rule on Catalonia, taking over the government, police, education, health services, and Catalan-language media. Within days, independence supporters staged more mass demonstrations protesting the arrest of separatist parties' leaders, while the now-deposed pro-independence Catalan politicians encouraged officials to defy takeover attempts. When Puigdemont made it clear that another election would not be held, the Spanish government responded by announcing an election on December 21. Catalonia formally declared its independence on October 27, resulting within a couple of days in a mass demonstration again by supporters of maintaining Catalonia within Spain. Meanwhile, given all this instability, many larger national banks and businesses moved their offices out of Barcelona. The chief prosecutor charged separatists in the Catalonia government with 'rebellion, sedition and embezzlement'; Catalan leaders, including the parliamentary speaker (later granted bail on condition of relinquishing support for independence), were arrested and brought to Madrid for trial. However, Puigdemont escaped first to Gerona, then (November 3) with four ministers to Belgium, where they appealed to a Belgian court for protection from an international arrest warrant.

As The History of Catalonia reveals, Catalonia has had an extremely long history – indeed, the people of Catalonia can trace their origins back many thousands of years, although Catalonia was not defined by that name until the twelfth century. Catalanian ethno-nationalism is deep-

rooted; the pro-independence events today echo, rather precisely, those which occurred almost a century ago. Yet among important points which complicate the question of independence for Catalonia – apart from obvious economic ramifications - the following may be considered:

European governments rightly fear that if successful, the Catalan independence movement could favourably influence the many separatist and regional autonomy movements of ethnic minorities across Europe;⁴; thus, the EU was quick to re-emphasize the need for unity rather than separatism. In fact, nationalist, separatist, and populist politicians soon arrived from across Europe and from Quebec to observe how all this would play out.

Moreover, another ‘complication’ is that the Catalan people are not coterminous with the autonomous region of Catalonia; the historic existence of Catalan-speakers beyond Catalonia and even beyond Spain presents an interesting potential political dilemma. Current counts and estimates of the numbers and distribution of Catalan-speakers tend to vary somewhat. In all of Spain, there are approximately 7 million Catalan-speakers; 4.1 million are native speakers, increasing to 5.2 million if Catalan is claimed as a second language. The total population of Catalonia – defined as the Catalonia autonomous region – aged over two years is now 6.2 million, of whom 4.6 million (about 73-75%) speak Catalan, as many as 95% claim to understand Catalan, however less than half actually speak Catalan at home as their primary language. Within Spain, the Catalan-speaking areas extend far southward down the coast into Valencia and even a small part of Murcia. Valencian dialects are regarded by linguists as closely related to Catalan.⁵ Approximately 2.5 million speak these Valencian dialects: in Valencia 31.6% as their home language (but more than half within traditional Valencian-speaking areas), whereas slightly less than half speak Valencian ‘perfectly to quite well’ – yet only about half of them can write in this language. To the east, in the Balearic Islands (Illes Balears), between 777 and 800 thousand Catalan-speakers predominate: 75% of the population speak Catalan while 93% can understand it. Westward, into La Franja, a Catalan-speaking fringe of Aragon, as many as 42 thousand (90%) are conversant in Catalan. And beyond Spain, Catalan is the official national language of Andorra, spoken by 61 thousand of the 77 thousand population, however just 38.8% consider Catalan to be their ‘mother-tongue’, compared to 35.4% who consider Spanish. Catalan is also spoken widely in Catalunya Nord in France: an estimated 142 to 200 thousand may be familiar with Catalan; more specifically, out of a total population of 462 thousand, Catalan is now spoken by about a third and understood by almost half.⁶ Even in the port of Alghero in Sardinia, Italy, 88% of the 44

thousand residents understand at least some Catalan, but today just under a quarter still regard Catalan as their home language.

In his history, Hernandez pays limited attention to these other Catalan-speaking areas. Yet, as we have noted, not all people within the Catalonia autonomous region choose to speak Catalan – a very high proportion claim some familiarity with the language, but less than half actually speak it as their primary language at home. To the west of Andorra, the situation became even more complicated: the Val d’Aran is an autonomous part of Catalonia where the traditional language is a dialect of the Gascon form of Occitan; thus this area is essentially trilingual in the Aranese dialect (the local language), Catalan (the regional language), and Spanish (the national language).

What proportion of people within Catalonia actually support independence is much debated – judging from elections, perhaps little more than half; yet whether Catalan nationalists who have favoured autonomy, short of complete independence, may now be persuaded to take a more radical political stance – especially in response to what they may regard as unnecessarily heavy-handed oppression by the central government of Spain (strikingly reminiscent of the Franco era) – remains to be seen. Whether this represents a sufficient proportion to proclaim independence is a moot point. Nonetheless, clearly Catalonia has one of the strongest and most politicized separatist movements of any region in Europe, in the context of deep-rooted ethno-nationalism and longstanding pride in Catalan language, culture and identity.

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Notes

¹ See, for example, Wittlin (1993, 1996).

² Past sources comparing language minorities within Spain have included, for example: Medhurst (1977); Tudjman (1981); Bell (1983); Barton (1993).

³ Guibernau (2006).

⁴ Sources comparing Catalan ethnonationalism with other ethnic minority movements in Europe have, over time, included: Petrella (1978); Conferencia Internacional de Barcelona sobre el plurilinguisme a Europa (1991); Calvert (1993); Shafir (1995); Rioux (2000).

⁵ Detailed in a special issue on sociolinguistics, *Catalan Review* (1995).

⁶ An interesting report on the teaching of Catalan in North Catalanian primary schools during the 1980s was: Verdaguer (1988).